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Introduction to the Social Landscape of Bistacchap 
 
A Case of CFUG collective mobilization (and under-reporting) 
In a damp, hilly jungle landscape a long line of peo l  slowly dig their way through the tough 
soil with “simple” tools. There are 145 women and men in all ages, who are working on the 
collective project of digging a ditch for a water pipe between the spring in Godawari and their 
community water tank in Ward 7. The work had been goi  on for several days already, and 
they were making steady progress despite a mediocre attendance. The organizers were 
discontent; a former veteran of the military – a large and well liked man, and Singh, an 
important charismatic chairman of Ward 7's Community Forest User Group, which organised 
the effort. In the process of the construction, trees had to be cut down due to their 
inconvenient location, and this of course slowed down progress, but the spoils of such 
“casualties of development” were split by equality principle between the attendees present at 
the site. These felling were unsanctioned, unlicensed, unsurveyed, and went unreported. I was 
explained that the cause for this under-reporting was that to report it would just a 'procedural' 
matter that could only risk trouble for the person doing the reporting. Informants across 
CFUG's have expressed similar opinions on what they regard as matters of formality.  
 Later when we were discussing the issues of the day at  Godawari restaurant, the 
organizers were considering enforcing the latent threat of fining absentee households, and 
they were discussing the grounds for such action. Had there been enough “awareness” about 
the project before hand? Surely, they had been here digging three days already. And in the 
face of the vast communal benefits of the water provided by the people working, it seemed 
appropriate to issue a fine. However, they couldn't agree between them, and in any case, they 
couldn't take such a decision without the rest of the board. The Department of Forestry in 
Godawari, which has responsibility for the administration of the Community Forestry 
Programme in the municipality regards this under-repo ting as a problem, but one that is not 
greater than it being budgeted for under the yearly 'forest infringement' post of the forestry 
statistics. However, the advantage of a better system or routine for registering such 
unauthorized felling, should prove beneficial for all p rties, since it makes management more 
predictable and easy. Alternatively, the upkeep of the cadasterial maps, and the registration of 
unlicensed treefellings could be anonymized, or repo t d to the CFUG's rather than the DoF. 
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Positionality 
 I arrived in Bistachhap in the harvest season of late august 2011, when the corn stood 
ripe on most of the fields, and my first day I was named Krishna, after the festival 
Krishnajatla, which was celebrated the following day. Much happened during my stay and I 
found many sources of distraction, and confusion, fr instance in the demarcation into 'wards' 
which separted the village of 'Bistachhap' into twodistinct 'societies' with their own temples, 
shops, and social networks, and still, all wards were part of the same village; Bisankhu 
Narayan. I struggled for a long time with method as to how to deleniate the field, without 
taking the administrative category of 'ward' at face value. Another peculiarity and source of 
confusion was the local narrative of a community of relatives – that in fact, the entirety of the 
(relevant) village population was related, and could trace their roots to a common, founding 
ancestor. This was at best a simplified partial truth, as there are minorities in the other wards 
that are commonly acknowledged to have occupied the land before the arrival of the Bista's. 
This is also an issue I found it difficult, if not contentious to investigate further, without a 
reliable 'gatekeeper'. There were issues regarding my interpretor and gatekeeper, who was one 
and the same person, and had been provided to me by an outside connection, embedded in the 
Nepali Civil society. The guide, gatekeeper and interpretor was also a chairman for the local 
CFUG, and without dwelling too much on this topic here, this led to a series of challanging 
situations, especially in the setting of the informal interview. Sometimes the expertise of the 
interpretor was of great benefit, at other times my informants would modify their answers as a 
part of self-representation toward me, the interpretor, or indeed toward the CFUG which he 
informally represented. There occurred some spectacular events during my stay, howver I 
could not see their relevance in the context of this project; like when the collective farm burnt 
down, and the airplane that crashed in the village. I would like to try to show how Community 
Forest management in Nepal can be seen as a state strategy for retaining control over the 
directions, aims and ethics of forestry, while at the same time encouraging wide popular 
participation in this program. The objective is self-sufficiency and sustainability, a system that 
relies only on government for advice and oversight. 
 
Grandpa' Bista and the Demographics of Ward 1 and Bisankhu Narayan 
 According to the oral testimony of the oldest man in Ward 1; 'Grandfather Bista' the 
6 
village of Bistachhap was gradually settled between 150 and 100 years ago by a legendary 
ancestral patriarch who gradually relocated cattle for grazing from Kathmandu to this valley 
due population pressure. At first they migrated season lly for the benefit of their cattle and 
goats, but slowly they settled more permanently because of the good agricultural land. The 
village Bishanku-Narayan is, as almost every local society in Nepal, divided into 9 sub-units 
called 'wards', these are administered by the Community Development Office (CDO)1, which 
is subsumed under the District Development Office (DDC) The borders of the 'ward' started 
out as the basis of my anthropological fieldwork. Of course, most of the villagers venture 
outside this narrow administrative demarcation almost every day, but the 'wards' are also 
commonly taken to be the administrative referent to one or more 'communities'. 
                                                 
1 'Community Development Office' – formerly, and still informally known as Village Development Office 
(VDC) 
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 The ward system was organised following after Panchayat2 system was introduced in 
1961, and although these politico-administrative borders mostly were drawn along already 
existing ethnic and familiar land, the informality of the excursions when these were mapped 
and drawn out ensured that simplifications and occasional incursions were made on others 
land if they were not present at the time. This has been assured me by the CDO Secretary 
rarely happened in Bisankhu Narayan. The political terrain of the village redrawn as was a 
way of fragmenting traditional authorities, centralizing power in the Village Development 
Office (the current Community Development Office and modernizing the bureaucracy. 
Bistachhap was separated into two distinct 'wards' due to the national plan that dictated 9 
wards for each village, and as Bistachhap was larger than most of the others it was separated. 
Today there is little social interaction between the wo wards, and distinctive societies have 
gradually grown out of this – at first – purely bureaucratic change. The explanation given to 
me for why the people don't associate between wards was that they do not know people from 
other wards, and – tautologically enough – the reason for this is they don't socialize with 
people from other wards; each community today have their own temples and tea shops. Most 
don't take the same bus route, although their children may meet together at school. The wards 
have grown into distinct societies, so to speak.  
 Ward 1, which was the main site for this fieldwork had in 2005 abt. 600 residents 3, of 
whom somewhere between 30 and 40% of the 'adult' population migrate on light motorbikes 
to work in Kathmandu and its peri-urban areas Here they work in offices; often for NGOs or 
in some related enterprise, or in business; quite often a family business in the service industry. 
Women regularly travel on the local morning bus, or walk, to the mill in nearby Badagaun 
with enormous loads of grains, and a more locally situated mill is high on their wish-list for 
'development'. Children and youths travel to Kathmandu to attend school in the wee early 
hours and return from mid day, depending on the heavy tr ffic. Bisankhu Narauyan lies within 
the Kathmandu Valley, and from the peaks of the community forest area, on a clear day, you 
can see Kathmandu's urban sprawl. The bus connectio takes an average of forty minutes on a 
good day, barring any strikes, accidents, gas shortages, or festivities should incur significant 
                                                 
2 Panchayats were local level officials appointed by the central state, the head of local 'self-governme ts' based 
on subsistence principles; mainly sustaining income for administration and sustenance through taxation of 
buildings and enterprise, as well as the extraction of corvee labour. 
3 NGO Health survey in Bisankhu Narayan 2005, found at CDC: not trustworthy. Other data from CDC 
statistical data. 
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traffic jams.  
 99% of the resident inhabitants of Ward 1 work some sort of combination between 
agriculture, horticulture, aquaculture and/or pastoralism. A great majority keep a few goats, or 
a herd – and it is quite common to keep a cow or tw. Free ranging hens and ducks are kept 
by many households. The hen house is an exception, although there were a few commercial 
enterprises in the valley that would in the west be branded 'free range'. These suffered during 
the fieldwork from an outbreak of bird flue that also came to Bistachhap from Bhaktapur. 
Land is privately owned, and ownership usually goes back generations within a specific clan, 
varying in size and quality. As a rule of a thumb, land is ideally split equally between heirs, 
making the titles smaller for each passing generation. Many siblings purchase property from 
each other, and this diminishes the tendency towards “f agmentation of estates”. Erosion is 
also a prime concern, but risk is still rarely a personal concern. Farmers are considering 
environmental risks constantly, but dangers and threats (Beck 2004) like erosion are 
considered external to one's sphere of influence and r rely considered, even in the case of 
local development initiatives or land development (IO CFUG Sanjit, DoF Vanajit). Land 
stability is critical to the people as land use is varies according to vegetation, soil micro-
systems, and crop requirements. The agriculture is a system of rotational dry and wet terrace 
management. Female labour contributions on dry lands is eight- to tenfold higher than that of 
men in field preparation and ploughing, including crow sowing, clod breaking, weeding, 
harvesting, manure supply and food processing. Women, by virtue of their continuous 
presence, are involved in seed selection, multi-culure soil improvement through manure 
supply and harvesting of crops for increased production of biomass for animals and human 
beings. Any loss or degradation of natural resources impacts women as they play a significant 
role in integrating agriculture, forestry, livestock, and maintaining a balance in land and 
household. Time allocation studies have indicated that 70-80% of field labour is performed by 
women, and that in the hills of Nepal, the women's share of the total work load is between 
150 and 180% more than that of men (S.Gurung 1994:330, 31-332). Gender issues, 
including the “women in development”-discourse will regrettably be almost completely 
absent from this narrative, due to textual considerations. But these data are important to keep 
in mind throughout the paper. 
 The Community Development Office (CDO) is based in Ward 1, and has the 
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administrative responsibility for all of the 9 Wards. Each ward has at least 1 CFUG, and these 
all meet together annually for coordination and sharing of experiences. There is little in the 
way of social interaction between the wards, most of them are self-sufficient in matters of 
small-businesses and ritual infrastructure. Earlier most wards even had their own local 
schools. A 'community' is usually constructed as a purely human domain, a sphere cultivated 
by human presence, but social formations are embedded in a biophysical context, and must be 
understood in the context of its surroundings and its cosmological framing of this social 
landscape, in addition to its historical relation t it. Through meaning-making processes in 
narrative and discourse; divergent meanings are formed and what is perceived as natural 
becomes objectified. At the same time these processes create multiple natures; simultaneously 
real, collective and discursive-fact (Escobar 1999:2, Baldwin 2003). Changing patterns in the 
conceptualisation and utilization of the landscape redefine the social relations between, and 
within village communities, and their relations to the 'environment'.  
''Representations of nature matter because they generat  very real material effects. 
When constructed as a natural resource, we are asked to assign value to a tree 
independent of the forest in which it stands. In mainstream political economy in which 
forests are identified as the true sources of value underwriting corporate bond issues, 
aggregate forest health becomes dutifully governmentalized through the discourses of 
conventional silviculture...'' (Baldwin, 2003:425)  
 
 The 'environment' is a historical phenomenon; partbiological reality and part social 
construct. The history of Nepali forestry is a history of state control, and although there is a 
stated policy of local empowerment, the state continues this policy of control through the 
program of Community Forestry  through institutional and procedural control mechanisms 
that govern the operation and foundation of the Community User Groups. (Mikesell 1994). 
The philosophy and institutions of community foresty encourages participation, by entitling 
'community' not only to resources previously forbidden, but also to access expert knowledge 
formerly monopolized by the specialists of forestry, and by mobilizing the local population 
through legible, state formations, the program is framing the conditions for interaction in 
deliberative space and engagement with the state, and in produce the new citizens and their 
life-worlds (Scott 1998, Sivaramakrishnan 2000, Escobar 1998 & 1999; Luke 1999, Baldwin 
2003:420).  
 I will attempt to show how the Community Forest Program reorders the existing lived 
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realities of the society and produces new citizens through the participation in community 
management practices and its associated activities. Thi  is accomplished through the 
Community Forestry philosophy of local management, that through espousal of the claim that 
'community' is the best mobilizing force toward collective interests (Leach 1997). The state 
decentralizes responsibility for management and fosters participation in forestry activities, 
with a focus on what is called 'raising of awareness', which is an important part of establishing 
a local regime of governance. The participatory profile f community forestry, together with 
an emphasis on a particular form of 'self-sufficieny' promote processes of commercialization 





















CHAPTER 1  
History of the Nepali Forestry 
 
 
 Prior to the unification of modern nation state of Nepal during the first part of the 18th 
century, the territory was divided into many autonomous principalities, displaying a great 
variety and intricacy in local management practices that varied with geography, caste, 
religion, and ethnicity. The unification was legitimated by the Gorkha kings as a strategic 
move to block British colonial expansion towards China, but as the expanding feudal state 
consolidated its power it intruded in significant ways upon local hierarchies, systems of 
management, and local practices of landholding suchas 'Kipat' (Gurung 1994). These local 
systems were typically comprised by clans or extended families, and usually regulated wide 
aspects of society rather than a confined 'administrat ve' domain of 'expertise'. Partly because 
of this, and because these systems were founded in r lational 'embeddedness' in the social 
networks within the society, such local systems could have balancing effects of social control 
beyond the financial motivations inherent in the distribution of 'common pool resources' 
(Fisher 1994).  
 The Gorkha rulers promised to guarantee the customary rights and privileges of 
communal forms of land tenure. However, in the process of consolidating power and 
centralising control in the new state, they confiscated communal lands of fugitive people and 
granted them to non-local settlers under other various forms of new land rights and a 
standardized code of laws, this way introducing newHindu elites to administer a new top-
tiered bureaucratic state. The new land rights granted by the monarchy to its local officials 
were premised in the central authority of the state, such as the Raikar'; land on which the state 
levies tax, Birta and jagir - lands granted by the state rulers to the members of nobility, civil 
and military officials, and other select groups in the society on which they depended for the 
sustenance and continuance of their authority. This, and other policies, such as encouraging 
the immigration of influential groups from Tibet and India, led to influential high-caste groups 
obtaining large land holdings while alienating many locals, and deteriorating communal 
commitments to forests (O.Gurung 1994) . The motivation providing the framework and 
parameters for the planned management of the early n tion of Nepal came from the ruling 
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interests of the feudal state, and were largely motivated by material and strategic interests; 
fiscal receipts, military manpower, infrastructure or“state security”. Templates were enforced 
by state administrative and military power, a totalizing narrative based in Hindu cosmology, a 
set of standardized codes of laws. Not least the Nepali language which the state went to great 
lengths to spread throughout the country.  
 There are many benefits of a national language; according to Scott (1998) the cultural 
project of imposing “a standard, official language may be the most powerful tool of 
standardization, and is the precondition of many other simplifications” (Scott 1998:72). 
Diversity in languages pose difficulties for state legibility, as well as for transparency, at the 
same time as the variety facilitate local autonomy and favour local monopolies. Hence, 
“Colonizers in most places and at most times try to gain control over both the material and the 
semantic practices through which their would-be subjects produce and reproduce the very 
basis of their existence.” (Comaroff & Comaroff 1992:236) In addition, hybrid discourses and 
diversity in comprehension emerge from disparity betwe n languages and measurements 
which may not be corresponding. Access to and co-presence in the same discursive arena 
necessitate some common ground in language; this doe  n t only increases legibility and 
transparency of local practices for state administrators, and facilitate conformity to state codes 
and streamlining of provincial administration, but also enable locals to incorporate and 
engage in a wider, trans-local; national discourse (B.Anderson 1983). In the creation of such 
an 'imagined community'4 as Anderson discusses, the bureaucratic elites would be favoured, 
and the mastery of to the Khas5 language a prequisite. According to Comaroff and Comaroff 
(1992:246), the moments when arguments and terms are crossing linguistic and discursive 
barriers are significant in the process of colonization. The favouring of one, national 
language, discriminating others, is itself a process of domestic colonization (Scott 1998:72) In 
Nepal the ethnically and culturally diverse valley r gions were linguistically and culturally 
subdued and incorporated into the condoned language of th  central state. Of course, this was 
not a complete transformation, but in making Nepali the only official language of Nepal, the 
authorities made a separation between the acknowledged and unacknowledged education. 
These other languages became important ethnic and ide tity markers, usually associated with 
                                                 
4  B.Anderson (1983) 'Imagined Communities' Verso  
5  Nepali national language 
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castes.  
 Because the local management systems usually were info mal and complex, the local 
regimes were 'illegible' to the central state, and could not be assimilated into an administrative 
grid, without being either transformed or reduced to a convenient 'shorthand'. Such shorthands 
are derived from an abstraction created from a narrowed, scientific gaze into an analytical 
field of inquiry, that allow a totalizing 'synoptic' template be assembled. The necessity of the 
process of centralization is to an extent implicit; 
“Legibility implies a viewer whose place is central and whose vision is synoptic. State 
simplifications are designed to provide authorities with a schematic view of their 
society, a view not afforded to those without authori y.” (Scott 1998:79) 
 
 After the Rana prime ministers ascended in a coupe d'etat in AD 1846, the exploitative 
feudal system introduced by the Shah rulers was further consolidated and professionalized 
into a colonial-type administrative structure based on a multi-tiered top-down hierarchical 
model (Bryant and White 1982 ibid Fisher 1994), that is “concentrating administrative and 
financial resources at the centre, while the local rganizations are entrusted with 
responsibilities without authority. The Nepali bureaucracy is encumbered with formalistic 
procedures and a capacity to delay rather than expedite both service delivery and program 
implementation” (Fisher 1994). Like their predecessor , the Rana rulers followed the policy 
of extraction and repression rather than production, and regarded public resources, such as 
lands and forests as profitable commodities. In addition to opening for sales of hard timber 
resources to the British interests in India, more fiscal policies became important for local 
management. The extraction of taxes to support the ruling families and military expenditures 
were the major policies of the government, and more and more lands of the hill people were 
converted from untaxable, 'unproductive' communal arr ngements into 'raikar'. This was 
precedented policy, both within Nepal, and in the spirit of the 18th French physiocrats, whom 
had condemned all common property on presumptive grounds that such inscrutable 
arrangements were inefficiently exploited, and fiscally barren (Gurung 1994, Scott 1998). 
'Nature' become 'natural resources' as the regimes of objective measurement unified fiscal and 
commercial logics in the “bottom line”, and the economics of scale. These developments 
opened the possibilities for for experimentally contr lling the environment, in theory at least, 
as the field is always subject uncontrollable variables. This narrowing of vision makes enables 
abstraction to be made in order to formulate policy. “This restriction of focus reflected in the 
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tables was the only way in which the whole forest could, with reference and field tests, be 
taken as a single topic. In the regulated, abstract forest, calculation and measurement prevail” 
(Scott 1998:13). As the logic scientific silviculture was virtually identical with the logic of 
commercial exploitation in the determining power of 'the bottom line. These methods of 
standardization and control not only increased legibility, but empowered the bureaucracy to 
manipulate society with greater accuracy than before. Coinciding with commercial interests 
finding its way into locality, the forest as a habit t and social space increasingly disappear and 
is replaced by the forest as an economic resource to b managed efficiently and professionally 
(Scott 1998). The Rana government also introduced many different forms of corvee labour, 
chief among which were the dedication of labour to the construction of temples and 
infrastructure – in particularly military logistics and agro-forestry including the appropriation 
of 'waste land' (user-right lands). The extraction of taxes and the introduction of corvee labour 
placed a heavy burden on the hill population, particularly the peasantry, resulting in 
progressive impoverishment and increasing internal inequalities. As the state began to assume 
control over increasing fields of the society and communal resources, the base of the 
legitimacy of local institutions fractured. Locals became increasingly locked into grossly 
inequitable and discriminatory patron-client relationships of various forms, and a dependence 
of the dominant class of the bureaucratic feudal state (Gurung 1994:85). The increasing 
appropriation and  commodification of 'natural resources' in this period was a central element 
of the great transformation to a market economy – and, t the same time, led to 
disenfranchisement of the local population, and combined to increase problems of 
degeneration of forests (Gurung ibid Allen 1994:84-85). Scott (1998) writes a particularly 
enlightening paragraph concerning the Nepali context of modern statecraft, and one may 
consider it to be roughly describing the changes during and after the Rana regime. 
“An illegible society then, is a hindrance to any effective intervention by the state, 
whether the purpose of that intervention is plunder or public welfare. As long as the 
state's interest is largely confined to grabbing a few tons of grain and rounding up a 
few conscripts, the state's ignorance may not be fatal. When, however, the state's 
objective requires changing the daily habits or work performance of its citizens, such 
ignorance may be disabling.” (Scott 1998:78) 
 
 The state sponsored exploitative and exclusionary modernization of forestry 
contributed to shape local population in its own image; a marginal and destructive force 
subsisting on non-sustainable practices, encroaching on degenerated forest lands (O.Gurung 
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1994). Access to the influence over these resources came primarily through the dependency to 
the top-tier bureaucracy and later the panchayats. It entailed a process of colonization, with 
the production of social landscapes and environments to suit the abstracted map of the central 
plans, and “an attempt to create specific subjectivities (Scott 1998, Comaroff & Comaroff 
2005:16).  
 In 1943, the state initiated an extensive land registration process, in which the 
conversion of 'waste land' to taxable crop lands waencouraged, emphasizing economic 
growth through the industrious work of subsistence people . The policy led to a concentration 
of land holdings in with the dominant sections of the population, who were able to acquire the 
more fertile agricultural lands and rich forests in their names, and further marginalized people 
who depended on common management regimes, whose rights were illegible to the modern 
state by this time. This policy substantially aggravated the deteriorating condition of 
resources. (O.Gurung 1994) After the second world war, the Nepali nation state had 
strengthened both its hold of, and mandate over 'society', as a reified object, separate from, 
and subject to state manipulation (Scott 1998). Although Nepalese territory had not been 
under attack during the war it had been an ally of Great Britain, both supplying soldiers from 
elite units, and allowing the British to recruit directly from within Nepal. Already, Nepali 
soldiers had been serving in India, and the state hd managed to produce institutions, 
infrastructure and statistical knowledge about its population, that allowed for categorizing and 
abstractions that in the 1940's and 50s opened for  
“Social engineering according to technical standards – the abstraction of an artificial, 
engineered, society designed, not by custom and historical “accident” or reproduction, 
but according to conscious, rational, scientific criteria. All aspects of society could be 
improved upon. (…) Similar [to the gardener who impose his own ideals of utility, 
order and beauty upon nature], social engineers conci usly set out to design and 
maintain a more perfect social order. An enlightenmt belief in the self-improvement 
of man became by degrees a belief in the perfectibility of social order.” (Scott 
1998:92-93)  
 
 The first high modernist blueprint introduced was the Green Revolution, arriving in 
1946. Great promises of development in the agricultural, industrial, energy and transportation 
sectors were delivered from the king himself to soldiers returning from the front. In fact – the 
event was seen as so prestigious that the soldiers were called back to the capitol to be greeted 
a second time for the ceremony to be performed more elaborately, in public. (IO Grandpa 
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Bista) That promises were delivered to raise living conditions through agriculture was no 
coincidence. The large majority of the population relied on subsistence farming, and the hope 
was also that by increasing the yield of the Nepali “marginal subsistence agriculture”, the 
state would also curb illegal incursions in the forest. Comaroff and Comaroff (1992) 
comments on this issue; 
“The belief in the civilizing role of cultivation is as old as English colonialism itself... 
Agriculture made men peaceful, law-abiding, and governable. Agriculture... would 
cultivate the worker as he cultivated the land: production of new crops and the 
production of a new kind of self hood went together in the evangelical imagination.” 
(1992:246) 
 
The intensified agriculture of the Green Revolution led to heightened living standard, at 
decreased labour costs (IO Grandpa Bista), but there was a lack of market access, and slow 
delivery of other development initiatives. Most farmers in Bishanku Narayan remained 
subsistence producers, and still most farmers rely on a combination between intensified 
agriculture with a more "traditional" integrated agroforestry that relies on natural fertilizers 
and rotation of crops. 
 In the 'Private Forest Nationalization Act' of 1957 remaining unregistered public and 
communal lands and forests were nationalized. This nationalization further eroded villagers' 
socially embedded incentives to protect their forests and other local resource. It undermined 
villagers' social obligations, motivation and incentives to protect communal resources, as it 
formally mitigated the social contract of village pople in forest management. Villagers whose 
control of nearby forests had been removed often succumbed to the temptation of possession 
by capture. The nationalization program undermined th  local systems of authority, which 
often maintained their charismatic power by showing their influence through practical action 
in a wide sector of society; the modern state was chipping away at the mandates of the village 
heads. The enforcement of the Act of 1957 is said to have resulted in the decline of forest 
area, as well as the forest condition in certain regions of Nepal, and was believed to have 
destroyed the 'indigenous systems', however some persisted and have outlived the Act of 
1957. (Bartlett and Malla 1992 Chhetri 1994:20 Bajracharya 1983, Gurung 1994) 
 The Panchayat system was introduced in 1961, and the remaining fragmented 
administrative powers of the village head was transferred to new local officials. These 
traditional headmen, who gained their authority through the positions they held in social 
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structures of kin groups and through their achievements in society, played key roles in village 
affairs. They had served not only individual or community interests but a wide array of 
interests of all village members irrespective of clan, lineage, kin and caste. In local systems of 
authority, village heads were powerful in regard to all village activities including forests and 
pasture management. The introduction of the Pancayat system was an attempt to centralize 
authority, and this undermined the relatively participatory process with regard to resource 
management, and in its stead put in place a set of rules and obligations in line with the feudal 
state hierarchy. In addition, Nepal was proclaimed N pal a Hindu Kingdom and Nepali, or 
Khas the only official language. These nationalist policies further marginalized Nepal's multi-
religious, poly-vocal, and multilingual character, and formalizing the basis for already 
existing discriminatory practices. These transformations created not only conditions for 
resource destruction, but dismantling of the social order, or rather bureaucratization of the 
local society. In 1968 the Panchayat Forest Rules were introduced, in which all remaining 
common property lands were legally converted into raikar; taxable land – a government 
policy further accelerating the deteriorating conditions of local resources, as many people in 
the hills could not register arable lands in their names and they were forced to encroach 
further on forest areas. (Gurung 1994)  
 Faced increasing forest degeneration, and the incapacity of local management to 
efficiently cope with this problem, the government began to experiment in 1976 with the re-
creation of communal property rights. Rasaily (2011) notes that  
“Community forestry policies emerged in Nepal as a response to "institutional failure" 
at the local level, which had led to progressive degradation of hill forests. The 1976 
National Forestry Plan acknowledges deterioration in the hill forest and the need for 
community involvement. Following the plan came to amendments to the Forest Act in 
1978, providing handing over of forest to Panchayat (lowest level of administration at 
the time).” (Rasaily 2011:13) 
 
However, this could not be the only factor leading up to the passing of the 'Panchayat Forest 
Rules' and 'Panchayat Protected Forest Rules' in 1978. The revision was not only motivated 
by a sudden faith in local democracy or similar notions, a large part came from the concern to 
guard the commercial resources of the forest – 'the Wealth of the Nation' from the 
irresponsible population. According to Fisher (1994) the community forestry program was 
promoted largely on the basis of two entrenched premis s; 1) The Forest Department had not 
been able to control the forest resources through the measures taken with a policy of gating, 
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due to relatively limited manpower in comparison to a large dispersed population and the 
wide geographical distribution of forest resources. (Fisher 1994:65) To make matters worse, 
there were worsening conditions of inequality and 'underdevelopment' in the country, partly 
because of the oppressive policies, which left the s ate uncapable of delivering promises of 
increased living standards.  
 2) The second premise for the promotion of community forestry in Nepal, according to 
Fisher (1994), was the assumption of population growth was at the root of the problem of 
deforestation, now known as 'the Tragedy of the Comm ns'6, a now contested thesis. 
Administrators reasoned that by empowering the local population through granting them user-
rights, bound by rules and regulations of the 'ban nagh' – the Forest Laws, enforced by the 
social contract of the 'community' itself; would be a more resource-efficient means to curb 
illegal activity than by a 'fencing' policy. When the community forestry program was being 
implemented in the 1970s and early 1980s, the existing local, 'informal systems' or 'flexible' 
systems of management were overlooked in the attemps to create new 'community forestry' 
institutions. This oversight was made on the side of academia because the 'indigenous local 
systems' were largely viewed through the perspectiv of primordialism or originalism, and 
thus thought destroyed, and on the side of state administration, these informal formations 
were largely illegible to the cadestrial maps and measurements. These systems were not 
necessarily “traditional” in the sense of having long pedigree, rather, they were often 
relatively recent and dynamic responses to changing situations. Customs are best understood 
as “living negotiated tissue of practices” (Scott 1998:34-35), and the flexible structure that 
lend a capacity for dynamic and adjustable response are important characteristics of what is 
often labelled 'indigenous' as opposed to 'modern' common property management. They were 
continually being adapted to new ecological and social circumstances and relationships. 
Chhetri (1994), also emphasise that "people not only k ow the importance of forest resources 
in their farming economy but have had a perception of hamro ban (our forest) towards local 
forests" (Chhetri 1994:29), insisting on the importance of identifying “legitimate” 
stakeholders, and ideally also continuity with such 'flexible' or 'informal' systems when 
establishing formal Community Forest User Groups (Chhetri 1994, Fisher 1994:70) to draw 
on the strengths of hamro ban. As the CFUG's were formulated, abstracted and establi hed, 
                                                 
6  Hardin (1969) 'Tragedy of the Commons' published in Science 
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the relationship between citizen and state was also rec nstituted from one of obligation in a 
feudal hierarchy into a new contractual arrangement. (Feeny 1990, Chhetri 1994:31, Fisher 
1994:65, Messershmidt 1994:99). 
 Another particularity arose through the distrust of the social sphere, perhaps reinforced 
by international environmental discourses; the introduction of a 'Forest First' policy in the 
Community Forest Program (Rasaily 2011:11). However, if it is seen as a continuity with the 
emphasis on production, then it is in accordance with the top-down model of Community 
Forestry seen in its first era, such as the the Decentralization Act of 1982 empowered 
Panchayat to form people's committees for forest management, mobilizing the local populace 
for an efficient management of forest resources. The Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-1990) 
prioritized the mobilization of people's participation in forest management to ensure their 
subsistence needs were met. The decade saw a number of donor agencies assisting His 
Majesty's Government (HMG) with resources and other aid for the Community Forest 
Programme, and since the late 1980s there was a significant increase, partly as a result of 
changing the focus from the panchayats, who were abolished, over to Community Forest User 
Groups (CFUG's) (Messershmidt 1994). The Master Plan for the Forestry Sector (HMG/N, 
1988) allocated 47% of investment in the forest secor in support of Community Forestry 
programs, and envisioned that all the accessible forests should be handed over to FUGs7. 
(Rasaily 2011:13) It was a change in policy on a  high modernist scale, aimed at radically 
changing not only policy and management, but the society itself.  According to the Forest 
Sector Master Plan of 1988, Forest Act of 1993, and the Forest Regulation 1995, forests in 
Nepal have been categorised into private and state own d forests. Private forests are 
subdivided into Single entity and Private Land, whereas the categories of state, or national 
forest are more complex; 'Protected Forests', or reserv s; 'Government Managed Forests', 
Religious Forest Management (forests managed by religious groups for conservation and self-
sufficiency), and 'Community Forest Management' (Maharjan 2005). Biologists would add 
that in Lalitpur municipality there are subtropical, tropical, and temperate forests.  
 The formalized and legible CFUG represent a recognized group; stakeholders of 
'common pool resources', with recognized user-rights and responsibilities for its management. 
                                                 
7 Such as the Narayan mandir in Bisankhu Narayan, which has its own religious forest with its own User 
Group. 
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(Fisher 1994:65-66)  
“Of all the programs of Nepal's forestry sector, community forestry [CF] has been 
accorded the highest priority... Much to the satisfction and pride of everybody 
involved in the program, Nepal's community forestry has been widely acclaimed as a 
successful forest management approach. Indeed, the program has resulted in rural 
farmers gaining increased access to forest resources, together with improvements in 
biodiversity and landscape values. To date, 1.1 million hectares of forest (about 25% 
of the national forest area) has been handed over t more than 13,000 Community 
Forest User Groups (CFUGs) involving 1.4 million households (35% of Nepal’s total 
population). (HMGN, 2004)"  (G.Karki 2006:2)  
 
The link between environmental degradation and social inequality has led to a renewed call 
for the 'eradication of poverty', but now with 'local ommunity-based models' centre-stage. 
These measures seem to encourage local participation in all aspects of political, economic and 
social life; and thus to empower and include local interests as they ''bypass'' a burdened state 
level (Dahal 2003, UNDP 2009, Turner & Hulme 1997). The 'local community management' 
model of Nepal has also received international acclaim; as a good example of a ''sustainable 
and inclusive conservation practice, for its additional carbon sequestration, watershed 
protection, and for creating a buffer-zone between protected areas and communal agricultural 
land'' (UNU-IAS 2008:2, Dahal 2003). However, even as the forest in ward 1 was replanted in 
the late 1980s, the pine species of pinus perrula and pinus reuxburghi were selected, rather 
than popular multi-purpose trees. This was primarily for the preferred traits of fast growth and 
commercial value, betraying a disinterest in 'non-timber forest resources' (NTFP's) and farmer 
interests, and a dedication to scientific principles modern forestry, and the precedence of 
fiscal policy concerns of the central administration. 
 The revolutionary years of the between 1994 and 2004, known locally in Bistacchap 
as “the Years of Trouble”, took its highest toll in the 'less-developed areas', as well as in 
excluded groups of population, including rural agricultural labourers. The conflict damaged 
physical infrastructure, along with the schools, health centres and other social facilities. The 
restrictions imposed on the mobility of people – not only restricted access to public services, 
but authorities on both sides forbade the informal gatherings of small groups in public places. 
 
 Even peaceful demonstrations were met with state viol nce. (UNDP 2009:22-23, Oxfam 
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20098). The social landscape is changing in the wake of the civil war, and in the face of 
climate change. Marginalised communities tend to be those most vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change; such as  a rising frequency of flash floods (ICIMOD 2008); changes in the 
monsoon rain patterns that disrupt production of staple crops and contribute to declining 
water resources; and an increase in the prevalence of vector- and water borne diseases (UNU-
IAS 2008, Oxfam 2009). Changes in the environment and in weather pattern, as well as the 
strategies undertaken to remedy impacts of climate change, like Disaster Risk Reduction 






















                                                 
8  Oxfam 2009. Even the Himalayas have Stopped Smiling; Climate Change, Poverty and Adaptation in Nepal. 
www.oxfam.org Oxfam International 
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CHAPTER 2  
Rules, regulations and stakeholders in Bistacchap.  
 
 
Philosophies of the Department of Forestry 
 To the Department of Forestry; the protection of bi logic diversity and the “generation 
of benefits for the community” are the most important priorities of forest conservation. The 
District of Godawari, with more than 254 bird species, amongst them the unique spiny 
babbler, has been proclaimed an “Important Bird Area” by the NGO Board of Conservation. 
Indeed, there are more than 300 species of butterflies and numerous other species of insects, a 
deer reserve, but also leopards, wild pigeon, wild cocks and more species are regaining their 
hold in the area, unequivocally ascribed to the success of the CF model by Vanajit, secretary 
at the DoF (27.09.11). The philosophy and practice of community forestry in Nepal is often 
said to entail a “handover of responsibilities” and rights from the state to 'communities', 
represented by 'Community Forest User Groups' (CFUG's), administered by the Department 
of Forests (DoF).  As explained by the DoF Secretary, Vanajit;  
“People were separated from the forest in the past through the rules and regulations - 
'ban nagh', with problems such as poaching abounding. These issues have improved as 
people have become involved in the management and are given responsibilities. As 
people are entitled, they become responsible, and together we can solve common 
problems.” 
 
 As the policies changed in favour of empowering the local populace with more managerial 
responsibilities, more entitlements to user rights and control over distribution, the DoF shifted 
from policing to “raising awareness and fostering good management practices.” One of the 
rangers at the Godawari Forestry Department, whom I call Arpit, describes the regime before 
the reforms of the 1990s; 
“The forestry department's officials were more like police before the institutional 
reforms in the 1990s; hunting down trespassers and criminals, now we are more like 
administrators, bureaucrats and advisers. It is impossible to separate the forest from 
people and people from forests. They are different, but depending on each other, and 
for the state to keep them apart only worsen the problems.”  
 
Whereas a generation ago local villagers used to break into the forbidden Royal Botanical 
Gardens in Godawari – a favoured resort for the prince and royal family, after the royal 
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massacre in 20019, the gardens have become a popular tourist attraction, resort, and a trendy 
place to take an acquaintance to embark on private, flir atious strolls. The entry is free for any 
local villager, but some complain that the gardens now are in decay compared to their glory 
days during the monarchy when entry was prohibited, an  quite a few ascribe this to laziness 
among the workers. The Botanical Gardens and their vicinity also contain several research 
facilities for agriculture, forestry and horticulture, and even a research facility of aquaculture 
is nearby, although it too has seen better days.  
 According to my informants at the CF program it is working well compared to the 
earlier Panchayat system. With this massive cluster of state and quite a few NGO research 
institutions in the vicinity, the average populace of Ward 1 in matters of agriculture and 
forestry is above average when it comes to education, b th formal and informal – both men 
and women. Community Forestry under the CDO has a fr more inclusive and accountable 
profile than the earlier panchayat regime, since it splits responsibilities between the CFUG's 
and the DoF. According to Sanjit in the CFUG, its structure is less exposed to patronage-client 
relationships, and it decentralizes decision-making as well as making the discourse accessible 
to locals through the CFUG. Community Forest User Groups (CFUG's) are formed on the 
basis contractual arrangement between the 'community' – represented by households, and the 
Department of Forestry. The households are responsible for the development, conservation, 
management and utilization of the forest in line with the terms and conditions stated in an 
operational plan (Baral, 1993). 'Community Forestry' (CF) management is founded on two 
constituting documents that formalize and stipulate the contractual relationship between 'the 
user group' and Department of Forestry. These are 'The Constitution of the Community Forest 
User Group', "which governs the people", and 'The Management Plan' "which governs the 
forest". Scientific principles of management are utilized to 'manage' both entities through 
formalized regulations and institutionalized norms. (Chhetri 1994:22, Fisher 1994, DoF 
Forester Vasantraj 26/08/11). Both the department and the User Groups are provided with the 
authority to sanction violators by issuing fines, exclusion from the CFUG and hence from the 
'community', but the DoF has the additional power to recommend rebuking CFUG charters. ' 
 These two constituting documents used to be part of nationally coordinated five-year 
                                                 
9 The Royal Massacre June 1. of 2001 at the Royal Narayanhiti Palace where most of the royal family was killed 
by the Prince. 
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plans. However, this policy was changed in favour of local differentiation. It was pointed to 
the fact that different forest compositions have different needs, especially considering the soil 
quality and the rates of regeneration. The change was thus made favouring local forestry 
concerns ahead of national standardization control, and now Management Plans are open to 
revision between 5 and 10 years; within the national framework. This change in policy 
favouring diversity and flexibility in planning points to a persistent 'forest first policy'. But 
what changed the policy in favour of local management was not social concerns, rather an 
ecological focus on the forest condition; led by modern and scientific principles of 
administration. IO Vanajit at the DoF noted that “10 years might seem a long time to a human, 
but to a forest 10 years is a very short period of time.”  
 The planning in Godawari is revised every 10 years and when these constituting 
documents are to be negotiated, incoming suggestions fr m all 9 wards are added to the 
agenda of the meeting. There are several factors that affect the relationship between the DoF 
and CFUG's at this juncture, for instance the degree of textualization and formalization of 
participation, the degree and nature of contact betwe n foresters and CFUG members, and the 
attendance of the CFUG to, and degree of coordinatio  t the annual CFUG meeting. Experts 
also enter into the surveying and planning of these events, and may not favour neither DoF 
nor the CF positions. Meetings are held over several weeks before representatives meet with 
the DoF to negotiate the nationally prepared plan for possible local adjustments. There is 
some leeway in regards to the Constitution, but the Departments act as a conservative buffer, 
usually requiring several engagements before any changes are implemented, requiring 












 The Management Plan is the document that “governs of the forest”, and specifying the 
principles and practices of Community Forestry 
according to the Nepali forest acts, as well as central 
plans for forest and rural development. The 
community forest is managed according to scientific 
planning. In fact, the Community Forest of Ward 1 
was replanted in the regimental fashion of even-
distanced lines populated by the pine species of pinus 
perrula and pinus reuxburghi, 25 years ago. These 
species have a rapid rate of growth and good survival 
rates in most environments, in addition to being 
producers of resin which can be used for making 
turpentine, biofuel, and other useful products 
(Forester Vasantraj 26/08/11). Collection of resin 
from the pine trees are performed according to the 
scheduled management plan, and the trees are 
divided into even sized blocks that rotate, so that 
every tree is utilized only every fifth year.  
 The state has rolled back its presence, and 
although the forests still are patrolled by DoF rangers from the office in Godawari, they are 
meant as overseeing and surveys of the management regime that is in place, and their primary 
responsibility lies beyond the Community Forests. They regularly embark on patrols with 
armed guards. It is uncommon that they directly encou ter illegal activity, and if they come 
across irregularities they record them for updating he statistical data feeding the Management 
Plan, and possible official action. There are indeed f w grievous oversights or violations that 
would need immediate response. To illustrate, there is a total ban on hunting in the entirety of 
the Lalitpur municipality, and according to local DoF officials and local informants alike, no 
problems of poaching in the area. Even when a leopard w s spotted one night in the dark 
season, rumoured to have attacked a man on a bicycle, no-one considered going to hunt for it. 
As the objectives for the patrols have changed, so ha  the training of the rangers and the 
Resin being tapped from the CF trees 
for turpentine production 
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guards. Rangers now also make notes of changes in the landscape, and progress in the 
objectives of the scientific management, and have the dual aim of being available to random 
villagers they might encounter in the forest to offer advice – whereas earlier they mostly were 
a threat or deterrent to the locals they encountered, and this now has changed to a preventive 
policing, or investigation.  
 Among the forestry officials I met in the Godawari district, the rangers were the most 
self-conscious in regards to self-representation and their activities as representatives of the CF 
programme. As the field personnel with most exposure to the stakeholders, the rangers have to 
balance the dual and, according to Chhetri (1994) incompatible roles of policing the forests as 
well as promoting community forestry. They have to save or protect the forest from the people 
and also try to foster people's participation in protection and management. Chhetri questions a 
ranger on this dual role and is told that in implementing community forestry you need to work 
with rural people, and for this the DoF need to establish a rapport, which is a process that 
requires time. Official actions such as reporting violations, sanctioning and prosecution 
erodes the rapport of the individual rangers involved, but also the foundation for cooperation 
between the DoF and the institutions of CF. This destructive unravelling of social networks 
works faster than rapport can be rebuilt. Unless sanctioning of the 'community' is used only 
sparingly, the local people may develop negative feelings towards the philosophy and practice 
of community forestry itself under such a 'paradoxical situation' (Chhetri 1994:26). This 
explanation of the self-management of the rangers suit the perspective told to me by Arpit; of 
a ranger as balancing the roles of mediator/consultant with surveyor/inspector, and the 
importance of a good relationship between the rangers and the stakeholders is key to building 
a successful management regime and promoting the trust of CFUG stakeholders (Gurung 
1994, DoF Arpit 26/08/11).  
"The encroachment of forests by individual families [is one of the main sources of 
concern in regards to deforestation in the district, as] these days everyone wants a road 
right up to their front porch. Though it may seem insignificant on a case-by case scale, 
on a wider, aggregate level, seen per annum, the toality causes much deforestation.” 
(DoF Secretary Vasantraj) 
 
Again, it was pointed out that the local problems were insignificant when compared to the 
Terai. But such free riding undermines the CF programmes rationale of empowered local 
responsible management, which rests on consensus. The CFUG's are usually unwilling to go 
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against individual stakeholders that wish improved access to their farms. With the underlining 
notion that people and population growth is responsible for deforestation, the DoF ascribe the 
continuation of these developments, often unreported, but sometimes with the support of the 
CDC, as lapses in rationality.  In this system of gvernance great emphasis is placed on the 
interdependence between farmers and the forest; that farmers need a healthy forest for 
sustaining an agricultural system. The benefits provided by a well-managed forest are many; 
materials for construction; fodder; water pools; grass; plants and other NtFPs; locations for 
discrete rendez-vous' and picnics; it purifies the water; adds nutrients and minerals that are 
crucial to 'regeneration' of the forest, and to agricultural systems. The 'community' relies on 
the forest and is entitled to it only as far as it manages the forest in a responsible manner. In 
promoting this perspective; the forest as a necessary ervice provider, the DoF act as 
representatives for the forest. Although the DoF emphasize the benefits that return to the 
stakeholders, its emphasis is that the destinies and fortunes of people and forest are 
interdependent, and that the importance of this awareness in the 'community' is crucial to the 
success of community forestry. In fact, the 'community' is not irreplaceable; the entitlements 
granted to each CFUG can be retracted, and as the 'community' is as much a product of 
Community Forestry as the CFUG's are, they will be replaced by another CFUG; but the 
Forest, if mismanaged, is not so easily regrown. It is thus important to note that a 'community' 
does not equal to the society that it arise from, although in the case, Bistachhap, the 
administrative delineation of Ward seemed apt to cover the “legitimate” stakeholders. The 
DoF retains their hegemony as expert foresters, administrating the tools of scientific 
management that are only accessible to the 'community' through the DoF, and the training 
provided by them. 
 There are several local representatives, among them Sanjit, chairman at the CFUG of 
Bisankhu Narayan's Ward 1, who have commented that the rapid growth of the trees in the 
Community Forest make them bad construction materials, and their roots are less capable of 
retaining water and nutrients. There are worries that a homogenous forest composition 
increases the risk of erosion especially during the monsoon season, and is a cause of 
increasing acidity and that the fast growing trees are an unsustainable drain on the local water 
supply. Both forester Vasantraj and CFUG chairmen Sa jit confirm that the uniformity of the 
plantation forest of Ward 1 causes problems. In particular because the pine litter cover the 
28 
forest bed and prevent regeneration of undergrowth, or second generation pine. At the same 
time acid levels are higher than recommended and rising, with a negative effect on the forest 
condition and productivity, not abated by scientific forestry's aversion to fire and preference 
for monoculture (Scott 1998, IO DoF Vasantraj, IO CFUG Sanjit). This will, acknowledged 
by both CFUG and DoF lead to Forest Death unless countered by some measures.10  The 
CFUG of Ward 1 has suggested changing the forest composition, as a measure to improve the 
forest and soil condition,  incorporating a more diverse range of multi-purpose trees 11that are 
slow-growing and have a more balanced effect on the ecosystem. In addition, they are 
interested in diversifying the range of species in the forest to increase 'resilience' and 
incorporate fruit and other useful trees in the community forest. The District DoF in Godawari 
are taking these suggestions under consideration, and are open for diversifying the existing 
forest. However they are not presently undertaking a y plantation projects; most planting is 
done by the civil society or private locals. To re-plant the community forest would not only be 
a large undertaking, but it is complicated by the issue of grazing, which the DoF leaves for the 
CFUG to govern. Further, forest health is also the daily responsibility of the CFUG, and 
ultimately the degeneration of the forest is as much a problem for the local farmers and 
herders as it is for the CFUG. 
 Fodder and grass is a 'common pool resource' (CPR), and herders daily take their goats 
into the CF to graze. It is currently unregulated by any formal rule, and if it would be 
regulated this would be the purview of the CFUG – and, Sanjit informed me, it would be not 
only be a political problem to restrict grazing rights, but also a problem of disseminating the 
necessary 'awareness'. In fact, fencing would seem a better solution. The DoF had no 
objections to the issue of fencing, as long as theydid not in some way infringe upon the 
                                                 
10 Scott describes the conditions when allowed to proceed to the extreme of 'forest death' 
 “...spruce roots are normally very shallow. Planted on former hardwood soul, the spruce roots could 
follow the deep roots channels of the former hardwood in the first generation. But in the second 
generation the root systems turned shallow on account of progressive soil compaction. As a result, the 
available nutrient supply for the trees became smaller. The spruce strand could benefit from the mild 
humus accumulated in the first generation by the hardwood, but it was not able to produce a mild humus 
itself. Spruce litter rots much more slowly than broad-leaf litter and is much more difficult for the fauna 
and flora of the upper soil layer to decompose. Therefore a raw humus developed in most case. Its 
humic acids started to leach the soil under our humid climate and impoverished the soil fauna and flora. 
This caused an even poorer decomposition and a faster development of raw humus... then the whole 
nutrient cycle got out of order and eventually was nearly stopped” Plochmann 1968 ibid. Scott 1998:20)  
11  Popular choices are fruit trees like "lapsi" – choerospondais axillaris; and "uttis" – Alnus nepalensis)  
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stipulated management plan. However, there are no rsou ces for fences, neither in the case of 
plantations, nor for protection of specific sites or species. If there were local initiatives to 
fence off areas, this would not matter to the DoF. It would be up to CFUG and its constituents, 
feasibly external donors, and the DoF may supply the trees and consult in 'scientific forestry'. 
This illustrates that the CFUG is within its right to initiate projects as long as they are self-
sufficient and within the parameters of the Management Plan and the Constitution (DoF 
Secretary Vasantraj, DoF Forester Vanajit 26/08/11). 
 Grass is not the only 'common pool resource' in Nepal, water under “community 
control”, and is “the property of the community, not the state” is the unison testimony of my 
local informants, including the DoF. That is, water is managed by User Groups along the 
same lines as the CF. Before the installation of modern water filtration installations and new 
water pipes, the distribution of water was a source of conflict in Bishanku Narayan, in part 
due to technical conditions such as the pressure in the few water pipes that supplied the 
valley, which favoured the households near the origin of the distribution system. Now, every 
The Shiva mandir of Ward 1, where the Day of the Dead, or "Yellow Party" was celebrated 
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ward is to receive its own water pipeline, a project that is far under way. This has, for 
instance, led to the near termination of the aquaculture research facility as the water for its 
upkeep is almost entirely being directed to village consumption instead. Despite, or perhaps 
because of improved access to water, there is now a increasing water shortage. Previously, 
there was only one main water pipe distributing water from Godawari through the valley to 
Ward 1, and with that solution many households were d prived altogether, and the location 
along the water pipe accorded you positional advantage in availability and quality of service. 
The new, modern, equitable water pipes are evenly distributing and remarkably efficient, but 
the water source is proving limited, and variable in its supply. It has been noted that the water 
table is sinking, and the quality deteriorating, but not in an alarming rate. But, in the face of 
this, there is less water available for government purposes such as nearby research facilities.  
 The water conflict becomes relevant to the forest when the fast-growing pine forest 
becomes suspected of not performing its invaluable task towards the farmer as described by 
the DoF's forest-friendly narrative. Many, including prominent members of the Community 
Forest User Group point to the forest as a main drain on water resources, and the cause of the 
poor condition of the soil and groundwater. The Department of Forestry, however, point to 
changes in water consumption patterns as a result of the improved access to clean water, as 
the most important reason for this experienced water shortage. A larger portion of accessible 
water is used today for consumption and household purposes than has ever been before, as 
access to water has been markedly improved the last 10 years with NGO's assisting in 
installing household water taps. Both the forest management and the responsibility for the 
'sustainable' management of water and forests have been ceded to community user groups, 
and even though the DoF will not impinge the CFUG's initiatives as long as they are in line 
with regulations, they do not seem to be supportive in t rms dedication of resources for 
practical action (IO DoF Vasantraj). This is also in line with the policy of 'self-sufficiency' 
which encourage the CFUG's to seek support outside of state institutions, of course still 
according to government requirements as stated in the r 'Constitution' and 'Management Plan'. 
 
Governing People 
 Arpit, the Ranger reiterated that "there is no use in trying to separate forests from 
people. That is why it was necessary with reform in the 1970s; to empower people to make 
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them responsible." The Constitution of the Community Forest User Group is the document 
that “governs the people”, according to the laws and regulations of “rational” management 
and administration. It is seen as essential to the success of the Community Forest Programme 
that the stakeholders are educated in these means, methods, and perspectives of modern, 
rational, scientific forestry, and the benefits that a healthy community forest yields. This 
awareness in the each member is crucial, because responsibility is decentralized on the 
premise that the 'community' can manage the regulations in accordance with plans, and the 
common interests of state and people. The DoF and its rangers thus place an emphasis 
“awareness raising” and consultation of local villagers in their daily management practice in 
order to promote responsible behaviour and self-sufficient, sustainable management.  
 Studies related to the community forestry programme in Nepal, have demonstrated 
Community Forestry as a potential tool with the capacity to relieve the central government of 
a lot responsibilities of protection; through education in the proper practices of scientific 
management. Being 'embedded' in the society, the CF management model enforces the 
national plans mainly through the participation of the local population, ideally with minimal 
external support. This increases the accountability of he system, and due to the contractual 
nature of the Constitution of the CFUG's, the state devolves little control and power. The 
system fosters more equitable distribution by giving responsibility for the management of the 
gains of the forest to the CFUG, and contributes to awareness both of the objectives, and the 
modern methods of management among the wider population (Rasaily 2011:11, Chhetri 
1994:27).  
 The definition of a community made up of shared interests is more than an assumption 
of some pre-existing harmonious society; it is a template form that once formalized and 
employed works towards its own aim. In order to apply for a CFUG status, one must, 
implicitly, formulate shared interests, and through the negotiations one engages in with the 
DoF through modern discourse valuing both 'scientific expertise' and local concerns, the 
CFUGs conforms to the state targets as formulated in the constituting documents and plans. 
Through practice, the 'community' shapes a government that resembles more the institutions 
of forestry governance they engage, than a representatio  of the 'community' that they 
emanate from. Through the active management of the forest and the education administered 
by the DoF, the stakeholders of Community Forestry are remade into the image of specialized 
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community foresters that are fit citizens for replacing the overstretched state apparatus, 
provided they follow the conditions stipulated in the CFUG Constitution and the Management 
Plan. Hence the biannual forestry training that any villager is encouraged to attend is crucial 
to the forestry programme's efficiency as a whole, as those regularly attending are 'cultivated' 
through specialized CF schooling 'en par' with thatof the professional foresters, management 
and fiscal training, and are encouraged to promote participation among their fellow 
community members. 
 According to the DoF officials in Godawari (27.09.11) rules and regulations are 
occasionally broken, but this is a very small problem. Further, violations are usually due to 
ignorance. Ignorance of the rules and regulations – of the proper management practices, 
misunderstandings; and this is best left for the CFUG to sanction. The binaries awareness and 
ignorance, responsibility and recklessness are frequently found in their rhetoric, and it is as 
though the only explanation for not following the forester's “scientifically” condoned advice 
must be ignorance or irrationality. A case in point is continuing practice of using Sal wood for 
house construction is a nuisance to the local DoF officials, who – although there is no 
significant Sal growth in the district – they see th use of this vulnerable species as a breach 
of the norms of responsibility and good governance; aft r all the export of 'Sal' wood is what 
drives the degeneration in the Terai. That the Sal is not from Bistachhap is no excuse, if 
anything it is incriminating as the timber brings with it the suspicion of organized crime. It is 
antisocial, and a breach of the fundamental traits of community forestry; ultimately – a 
problem of 'awareness'.  
 This focus on 'awareness' and 'ignorance' tends however to be reductive. Most 
violations of 'rules and regulations' that I have witnessed have happened in spite of awareness 
of these rules. These incidents have all been minor, but some increase the hazards to the 
society as a whole. For instance the 'new road' that was built over a three years connecting 
Ward 6 with Godawari, that went ahead without approved plans at the cost of 2 lachs that was 
collected by the populace as the road went without g vernment support. This road was 
constructed despite of government disapproval and it took several years to complete. I will 
return to this remarkable example of 'people's power' in the next chapter. A less invasive 
example comes from a late afternoon where I was invited by some young informants into the 
community forest to fetch some firewood. This is, of c urse, highly 'irregular', as almost all 
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forestry activity is performed collectively. They had already sought out the suitable tree; 
apparently dying. After we had finished cleaving it in parts, we carried the logs through the 
village to the Shiva mandir, where they were to be used for a bonfire to celebrat  the Day of 
the Dead. There are made provisions for such religious use of forest in the Constitution, but 
the quantity that had been assigned for the festival had proven inadequate, and it was 
necessary to send the kids to fetch more. It was deemed 'troublesome', not least a bit too late, 
to notify and apply for the additional use of forest timber for the festival that was later the 
same evening, and they felt very certain that if they ad applied, they would get approval in 
any case. The violation was really just a breach of pr tocol, and they felt that to follow it in 
this case would only entail needless effort and risk of 'problems' with the authorities – which 
nobody wanted.  
Local community management 
has a strong rhetoric of 
community engagement in 
forestry, and participation in 
forest activity. However, 
accomplishment in projects 
undertaken by NGO's and 
larger international institutions 
(such as UN REDD) are 
measured through the idiom of 
'performance'. 'Performance' is 
understood as a measure of the 
quantity and success of the committee work and of the orest management itself – the 
quantified evaluative procedures of government and donors, and it ensures that success is less 
perceived in the trees raised, or the people enfranchised, than in the spread of committees and 
creation of deliberative development spaces. The spr ad and activity of forest protection 
committees has, according to authors such as Sivaramakrishnan (2000) and Fisher (1994) 
become a main legitimating mechanism of such programmes; their work crucially determines 
the success of individual schemes and by their aggregation the success of forest management 
itself.  But, when it comes to participation in Nepali community forestry, at least as practised 
 
Playing cards outside the teashops in Bistachhap 
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in Bistachhap, the pro-active presence of 'community members' is itself implicitly forest 
management by preventing the illicit use, a parallel to the doctrine of 'preventive police work'. 
However, this participation is only measured once it is formally documented somehow. Thus, 
modern performance measurement still suffers from an overemphasis on the quantity and 
quality committee activity and the “programmatic insistence on committees” can lead to 
“rituals of personal commitment” (Herzfeld 1993:37), from the representatives. But there is 
also a tendency of bureaucratic organizations to confuse formal committees with effective 
organization and  mobilization (Fisher 1994), especially when measured through the lens of 
'performance'. 
 This liability is aggravated as many CFUGs suffer from a bad attendance rate, 
especially at the intra-CFUG meetings, where chairmen eet to coordinate and discuss plans 
and policy. This is mainly due to poor routines for ensuring feedback from each CFUG's 
'representatives' to their 'stakeholders', combining with sparse infrastructure and limited time 
to prioritize between agriculture, family, job and forestry. These factors combine to 
discriminate peripheral CFUG's, since the committee session are itself treated as an indicator 
of CFUG 'performance', and these wards are indeed prceived as inept in regards to forestry 
in part due to their bad 'performance'. But this measure underestimates non-formal, or 
'illegible' activity as mobilized through 'thulamanji' or by the CFUG informally. These 
problems of infrastructure and relaying information are also problems of accountability – it is 
hard to keep abreast of the work of the CF programme if the representatives don't attend, or if 
they don't report back to the community. But in regards to local autonomy – lax attendance in 
these meetings have little effect, as most of the information is received from the national 
directives to be spread to local constituents. It is mostly an issue of coordinated management, 
not one of coordinated mobilization – which is still largely performed outside of and prior to 
formal channels. The under-reporting and the lack of control over “reckless development 
projects” can not be ascribed to 'ignorance', but may have to do with a lack of institutional 
routine for feedback and inspection, and a self-interested dis-association on the part of the 
CFUGs or other agents of 'development'. Under-reporting could still be motivated by a lack of 
trust in the state apparatus, as not many years ago the f restry department persecuted those 
that are today the managers of the forest, and their guards still carry weapons into the field 
(IO CFUG Sanjit). 
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 All effective systems, whether they have a formal structure or not, have an 
institutional base which comprises at least some agr ed practices for regulating forest use. 
Stakeholders are usually fairly clearly specified through recognized user rights. In the 
'informal systems', infringements on norms and regulation were punished by village leaders 
according to the socially approved code of conduct. Rules with sanctions are sometimes 
involved, and the CFUG has authority to sanction breaches of the 'ban nagh' – the rules and 
regulations of community forestry. Its tools for sanctioning are fining, and exclusion of 
members from user rights, or to report their crimes to higher levels for formal prosecution. 
CFUG's in Bistachhap, however, rarely formally sanction their members. Individual 
exploitation is instead kept in check and local resources were protected by individual 
beneficiaries; as in the 'informal' systems, where there was a reliance not only on the 
economic equitable redistribution of goods, but also on considerations such as family needs, 
communal responsibility, respect, self-representation welfare, and strings of obligation 
between individuals and families. As the ranger Arpit said, "In CF management, the people 
police through the CFUG”. Only if the problems are too intricate or grave for social 
sanctioning, the CFUG will turn to external law enforcement (Vasantraj, Vanajit, Arpit DoF 
26/08/11, Shrestha 1990 ibid. Gurung 1994, Fisher 1994).  
 Community forest management accomplishes its utopian aspects of governmentality 
through tapping into these informal networks of interdependence by recruiting households 
into community management. Through participation in the field and in committees, as well as 
in training sessions, the 'entrepreneurs of community management' forge associations and 
rivalries, and they are equipped with the rhetoric f scientific forestry that enable them to 
engage experts, but more importantly, other villagers, in the deliberative space. But the CFUG 
is dependent on the cooperation of the 'community', and in especially contentious issues there 
is a reluctance to act for fear of loosing the legitimacy that the User Group depends on in 
order to mobilize. There is difference and discord within Bistachhap, but this is usually under-
communicated. This reflects back on issues of conformity; and to a certain extent on village 
reputation. Compared to my urban informants there is a notably low level of antagonism 
between law enforcement and the local populace of Bistachhap, but there is a reluctance of 
getting involved or involving outside authority unless the suspected responsible party is 
external to the local society. This may be related to a tendency to associate crime with non-
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locals. For instance, when there was a burglary with fatal outcome in the valley, no-one 
considered it possible that a local could be the culprit – as everyone knew everyone, and the 
responsible would have been apprehended. It turned out to be someone from a neighbouring 
valley. While gambling is illegal it is well within what is acceptable behaviour; no-one would 
imagine reporting it to 'the authorities'. “Small matters”; breaches in norms; debt; abuse; and 
petty crimes are all usually deemed private or family atters. Transgressors that seriously and 
consistently disrupt social order are frequently deem d 'psychotic', and the last category of 
serious antisocial behaviour, or inscrutable or serious crime, is seen as best left for external 
authorities to handle. External, in the sense that the CFUG have indeed authority to sanction, 
but also to arbiter or mediate in conflicts particular to their fields. 
 The standardizing and formalizing processes of statecr ft seek to induce a certain 
administrative culture within the CFUG's; the constitution and forest laws, formal 
proceedings, requirements of written protocols, etc. Through these founding and steering 
documents, the modern, rational expert local community forester is cultivated, and the 
legibility and transparency and accountability of the CFUGs is thought ensured, at the 
expense of flexibility (Fisher 1994, O.Gurung 1994, Mikesell 1994, Scott 1998). The state 
channels its forestry agenda through the Bistachhap CFUG and the engagement in scientific 
forestry with varying success and enthusiasm spread the 'modern' goals and methods of CF 
through the general population. With the national aims and the bureaucratic form incorporated 
into local forestry, capitalist citizens and landscapes are forged. As the state educates people 
in proper management, not only of the landscape, but also of proper administrative culture, 
hence of proper self-management; a greater awareness is fostered, probably unintentionally, 













'Communities' and 'Big Men' 
 'Communities' are usually represented in development narratives of 'local 
management' and 'devolution' in a simplified template form as homogeneous 'timeless entities' 
of shared meaning and experience. As simplifications, template concepts occlude complex 
social interrelations and frictions that arise from the very existence of identity (Baldwin 
2003), and they disregard the particular socio-historical and environmental contexts of 
specific localities. As such, templates and narratives are fictions that create their 'objects of 
inquiry' by distortion and social categorization. The distillation of conceptions into a 
standardized, simplified template means that other possible conceptions and dimensions are 
being obscured (Haenn 2005).  
 When I asked Vanajit at the Department of Forestry to define a 'community', and he 
arrived, referring to their guidelines to the 'community' as “a collection of people with 
common interests”. Indeed, Fisher argues that such 'communities' of common interests are the 
basis for community forestry (CF). Given that the Community Forest User Groups 
(CFUG's)are founded and dismantled on the basis of charters that stipulate their common 
interests, the DoF and the ban nagh are in fact key in formalizing these 'communities' as 
manifest entities. As was mentioned earlier, most of these CFUG's have a very thin continuity 
with previous so-called 'indigenous' institutions, and are created as they are ratified, and 
although some commonalities presumably are necessary to galvanize people into the 
application for CFUG's status, it is erroneous to presume that homogeneous common interest 
is the sole legitimate interests of a local society. However, most CFUG's are not only ratified 
as the representatives of the 'community' as a whole, but a “representative crystallization” of 
it. (DoF Secretary Vanajit 26/08/11) Operationalizing the CFUG as the 'community' makes its 
representatives the recognized, authorized, “cultivated” spokespeople of the society, who are 
empowered to engage in the modern discourse of scientific management – legitimate 
managers of the postulated 'common interests'; local interests that are at the same time shaped 
by 'cultural diversity', and in the end coinciding with national agenda as managed by the DoF.  
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Through high modernist methods of abstraction, the central administration create the CFUG 
template as a miniature of the society, and in engagi  the local populace in the management 
of resources, the hope is to galvanize them in the cultivation not only of a 'sustainable' – 
which in Nepal is to be taken primarily to mean self- ufficient – forestry management, but 
just as importantly; the cultivation of new citizens through participation.  
 As mentioned in chapter 1, the local, 'flexible' systems were typically comprised by 
clans or extended families, and regulated wide aspect  of society. While they were not utopian 
arrangements of equality or egalitarianism, they were part of a plural deliberative, or social 
space 'the multi-vocal society' (Geshiere 2004), which preceded the modern nation state 
institutions and reforms. Arguably, by being 'flexible' these local knowledge regimes did not 
disappear due to state modernization efforts, but rather adapted, and utilized what was offered 
by the modern state, as incorporating hybrid seeds in rotation and traditional, or rather -
“hybrid” agriculture.  
 There is a tendency, especially in a relatively uniform (in terms of caste at least) local 
society like Bistachhap, for the heterogeneity of huseholds not to be reflected in the way 
CFUG's manage their community resources, in line with Dev et al., (2003) observations. For 
instance, a minority of the Ward 1 CFUG members, which include the board of chairmen, 
argue in favour of an equity-based form of distribution, rather than the current equality-
distribution. Neupane et al., (2004) in their study from the Dhading district have, for instance 
concluded that CF must make special provisions and incentives to include and mobilize 
disadvantaged and marginalized people in order to allevi te poverty; which can also only be 
positive in the context of increasing awareness and f cilitating 'best practice' management – to 
the extent that the established CFUG's are capable of incorporating such marginal groups 
(Rasaily 2011:14). However, the majority is so far not inclined to change arrangements in 
favour of stakeholders relatively 'disadvantaged'. According to Sanjit in the CFUG, this also 
ascribed to “a lack of awareness” of the most just arrangement of the economy. Rasaily 
(2011:15) however contend that wealthier households tend to benefit from such a status quo, 
and since the households who dominate the decision-making processes and assimilate most 
information about community forestry through organized events frequently are the same. 
Those engages in the committees, courses and administrative activities, establish deeper 
relationships associated with the forestry discourse and official representatives than other 
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stakeholders. There is thus a tendency for local elites to be favoured in this process of 
expanding social deliberative spaces (Dahal 2003), and they have very little incentive, neither 
is there a perceived need to alter anything or to change any of the rules governing the way 
CFUG's operate. However the general, adult suffrage, that is inclusive of women and young 
men – however they are discriminated outside the formal sessions, make the CFUG a new 
arena for participation, and reconstruction of the int rrelationships that make up the society, 
while at the same forging a 'community of common interests'. 
 So, on the one hand, there is hence a correspondence with Dahal (2003) and Rasaily 
(2011) who points to the tendency for local elites to be favoured in this process of expanding 
social deliberative spaces. On the other hand, we see that through the 'universal suffrage' 
where each household is represented in the CFUG; the CFUG creates a new deliberative 
space that, while favouring merit, education and charisma12, makes room for upward mobility. 
In fact, the CF-programme creates the environment where it is possible for almost everyone to 
effect change through mobilization. In order to mobilize and increase the appeal of particular 
projects, the enlistment of 'thulamanji', or 'big men' is still important. In Nepal, a significant 
emphasis is placed on the charismatic power, or 'social capital' to use Bordieu's term, and 
there are still significant power exercised through patron-client relationships, and the 
important thulamanji – 'big men'13 who are social entrepreneurs that gain their social capital 
through their capacity to influence and effect practic l change. Fisher (1994) separates three 
factors that enable 'thulamanji' to retain their positions and influence, while discussing Dulal 
Brahmins';  
1.) As they are comparatively rich, they place others in debt either by providing loans or 
small gifts. 
2.) They act as brokers (intermediaries) between villagers and officials or project 
representatives. Their networks, reputation and charism tic influence are crucial to 
attract or affect investors, and they derive much of their reputation as thulamanji from   
3.) the capacity to effect favourable change and power to influence outsiders (IO Sanjit). 
If we now look at the terms associated with the t ulamanji, we see that these are 'big 
men' of action, they derive their charismatic power to mobilize, not through their 
                                                 
12 While women are under-represented in most formal CFUG activities, and communal efforts emphasize the 
male representative by default, young informants have not reported discrimination due to their age. 
13 The term of big man here refers to Sahlins’ classical article from Ocenia (Sahlins 1963).  
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capital alone, but more importantly from their credible association with successful 
'developments' and political enterprise (of others). What makes you a 'big man' is your 
ability to effect change, or 'merit'. In light of these considerations, the CFUG is 
opening a room for upwards mobility, as the only other constraints on the inner 
workings of the CFUG seem to be gender and the degree of 'embeddedness' in the 
local community.  
According to several informants, money is a means to effect change, thereby rising in the 
social hierarchy, possibly to the position of a thulamanji oneself. However, others contend that 
only 'thulamanji' have the wealth necessary to affect the society, and that the charismatic 
power of the 'thulamanji' is necessary to raise and preserve wealth for oneself, the family, and 
the society. This is a local theory of social mobility and mobilization, and a source of 
speculation around the theme of power. The power of a 'thulamanji' is intimately connected to 
his community, from whom he derives it. Most 'thulamanji' are private enterprisers, often 
businessmen, but it is expected that they direct significant amounts of their wealth to the local 
society – through 'development'; such as the construction of temples or roads, and the like. 
This separates the 'thulamanji' from the politician who is seen as self-interested an corrupted 
by politics, and the selfish investor, who is unreliable – that is, lacks the embeddedness of a 
'thulamanji', and privatize the profits. There are considerable risks involved in this top tier of 
the local society, as to manage the role of 'thulamanji' in many ways involves corrupting 
politicians while not becoming one of the corrupt politicians oneself. Also there are issues of 
personal finance involved, because one must not seem lf serving, lest one loose popular 
support, neither can one give away ones fortune, and loose the wealth that is the basis for 
one's material power to affect change. As such, the 'thulamanji' are experts at influencing 
political and bureaucratic institutions, and their support and influence is itself currency to its 
constituency.  
 To illustrate, there was a sentiment that the chairm n, and my 'gatekeeper' Sanjit – 
who is striving to attain the renown as a 'thulamanji'; a man of influence and capacity to effect 
change – was too untrustworthy to have the position on the board. Although he was local, 
from the majority portion of the populace, and his father had been a palace guard, he was by 
some seen as been working too much abroad as a migrnt, and lacked the settled connections 
that he ought to have to be a trustee of the community. This point of being settled, or 
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'embedded' to gain trust and status is an important one in the context of an agrarian society. 
Thulamanji gain this label through consistent inequality in reciprocal relationships, and a long 
term relationship with the community, for instance in the support of temple or roadworks – 
gifts that most other individuals or families could reciprocate. To become a thulamanji 
without a substantial sum of money, even as the chair of  CFUG with a donor NGO at hand, 
is unlikely as it takes time to earn the reputation hrough consistent successful endeavour.  
 The local Manakamana mandir14 stands as a testimony to the power and political 
cunning of the 'thulamanji'. The complex was previously a brick factory, but there were social 
dismay at the lack of benefit to the community – as the factory employed migrant workers at 
low wages. The factory was owned in a leasehold contract with the state by a non-local 
businessman, while the soil that it stood on still was community ground, and there were 
protests against this anti-social behaviour (it would be expected that the businessman at least 
granted some gifts, or the like, but there were no 'go ds' to be gained). Finally, so the story 
goes, with after enlisting several local thulamanji, the people managed to persuade a sadhu, or 
'holy man' to accompany them in occupying the factory facilities during a Holy Day, and 
                                                 
14 Manakamana is the goddess of Hindus 
Former brick factory and stone quarry, current Manakamana mandir 
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begin constructing a symbol of unity – the Manakamana mandir. The efficiency of the action, 
and the connections with party politicians in the Maoist party that was in power at the time 
proved invaluable as the state denied to enforce the claims of the factory owner, and sided 
with the popular action. Since the land was community owned in the first place, it simply 
reverted back to them. The factory, in name, is still owned by an Indian businessman, but its 
interior is long gone, and the bricks have been used for embellishments of the compound. 
This is what one may call 'effective collective action'. 
 
The Bureaucracy and the People – 'CF' a technocratic regime of administration 
 There is a gap between policy rhetoric and real imp e entation of 'devolution' in forest 
policy in Nepal. While Sivaramakrishnan (2000) and Dahal (2003) suspect local-level 
institutions of being appropriated and used as site for political lobbying and patronage 
practices by local elites, and misused by political le ders following devolution of political 
power, Mikesell (1994) disputes there is any signifcant power to appropriate; merely 
responsibilities. In the formulation and planning process, government priorities and concepts 
are 'mainstreamed' to local levels, while benefits for local users are considered only as 
incentives provided by the government, and hence there are great difficulties in incorporating 
local interests in development planning despite their recognized importance. Experts like 
foresters still make claims of authoritative control over relevant expertise, and influence the 
decisions at local levels as they get involved in wider issues of local politics and land 
administration through the rise of scientific expertise in deliberative spaces, in which they still 
share hegemony with a few other state departments. Thi  contradicts the rhetoric of local 
autonomy and devolution, as the elite knowledge regim  is restrictive, and unaccountable to 
constituents that don't dedicate themselves to the CFUG work (Brosius, Tsing and Zerner 
1996, Sivaramakrishnan 2000, Dahal 2003).  
 For example, District Forest Office staff in Godawari directly influences the 
preparation and constitution of management plans, allocations of funds, collection of taxes, 
and control over selling of surplus timber and non-timber forest products  (NtFPs) from 
'community', while formally this is the domain of the CFUG's. Periodical amendments of 
Forest Act 1993 favour government bureaucrats and expert knowledge regimes, and indicate a 
scepticism towards local autonomy, betraying a weak commitment on the part of the 
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government to implementing measures of 'devolution' democratic powers as stated the Forest 
Act (Dahal 2003). As bureaucratic officials are notaccountable by reference to their rights 
and duties, there is still a wide range of physical, social and cognitive gaps between the local 
people and government personnel (Gurung 1994).  
 I had the fortune of interviewing former Elected Village President Radha Krishna 
Basnet at his estate where we ate fruit on his front terrace with view over the valley. He was 
happy to talk about politics, since few came to discus  such issues with him these days. 
Former CDC Krishna had been a 'thulamanji' before getting elected as Village President, but 
as the political career failed him, he lost his charismatic power as well, and although wealthy, 
he is no longer considered a 'thulamanji'. Krishna emphasised that the powers of planning, 
legislation and execution “over the CFUG Constitution and Management Plan should be 
given to over to the CFUG's. They could also grow vegetables directly in the forest – a source 
of wealth for people. It should not be necessary to ask a 'superior authority'.” He was of the 
very opinion that in a true local democracy, “peopl should have absolute power regardless 
what they want to do” and the bureaucratic authorities should be “reduced to a monitoring 
role”. He complained that in the current multi-tiered bureaucratic system, only in the event of 
problems or requisitions would the many different committees and departments communicate, 
and there is a great lack of coordination, communication and documentation. He had, himself 
overseen the institution of the new CDC office and  new archival system to achieve more 
legibility and transparency, an improvement from the previous 'informal' system. But due to 
the centralized archive, the near complete destruction of the archives was achieved during the 
fire-bombing of the revolutionary years. The powers of execution and implementation were 
given over to the Secretary of the Community Development Office, a nominee of the central 
government. These powers include, the execution of the decisions of the village committee or 
town program, investigation of complaints filed with the CDC, the overseeing development 
projects and active NGOs in the area, and upkeep of vital statistics of birth, marriage, death 
and registration. The role of the development committee is to execute the policies and plans of 
the central government (Mikesell 1994:290-291). Abolishing the Elected Village President, 
and turning over the power of government to an unaccountable government official does little 
to advance the devolving of democratic powers, nor address issues of patronage . 
 Speaking with the CDC Secretary (24.10.11), she report d that there are strict 
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economic constraints that stifle development initiatives. The Secretary also informed that the 
Community Development Office experiences difficulty with irregular delivery of the 
budgeted finances which makes it difficult to consider budgeting any new initiatives. The 
secretary is not local, and only present in the CDC office once or twice a week. The Vice 
Secretary is local, and deals with most of the administrative responsibilities of the office. As 
he has closer connections to the local society, and spends some  of his free time there, he has 
more 'social capital' and 'local knowledge' than his superior.  
 The Municipal and Village Development Committees, which are responsible for 
development plans and budgets, are not governing bodies in which people legislate local laws 
or control their administration. Both Fisher (1994) and Mikesell (1994) claim that “swollen”, 
'colonial administration' is still entrenched in Nepal's state institutions, for instance the 
Community Development Office (CDC) merely administer programs as already determined in 
the ministerial portfolios. The functions of the municipalities are similarly top-down and 
multi-tiered. Mikesell argues that the only real accountability imposed on the local 
government by the ban nagh is accountability to the central government, in terms of the 'right 
of higher levels of government to 'suspend and dissolve the committees'. “If the members of 
the local government attempt to depart from the narrow guidelines specified by the law, which 
ensure that people have no power, then the central government has the authority to suspend 
the local committees at its pleasure." (Mikesell 1994:296) Yet in his formalistic focus, he 
overlooks the interrelationships that would connect people, even people in official positions, 
to some degree of –at least personal 'accountability'.  
 Mikesell argues at length that while the Forestry Act seems to be handing over powers 
to the people, the participatory terminology is mere window dressing for a law that devolves 
no new substantial powers – neither legislative, excutive, administrative, official nor judicial; 
just procedural rules (Mikesell 1994:287-288). The law's preamble state that the goal of 
village, municipality and district development committees is to maximize people's 
participation in 'development activities', not in government. At the same time the law leaves 
'development activities' to be defined and implemented from above, not from within the 
communities. 'Participation' is seen by Mikesell to signify the way people accept and go along 
with implementation, not decide upon or shape it, and that the Forest Laws are crafted in 
order to protect against autonomous action, to ensur  the preservation of power within a 
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bureaucratic hierarchy despite decentralization (Mikesell 1994:289). In Bistachhap 
participation, at least in CF management, was of a bro d scope. This may have simply been 
due to  the relatively uniform demography of the stakeholders. On the other hand, the 
importance of broad participation in active management, and attendance in courses and 
meetings, to the efficiency of the CF program and its philosophy of community management 
can not be understated. Engaging in the CFUG, the local populace not only fulfil valuable 
tasks of government, like management forest maintena ce, but they are also through activity 
re-created as cultivated foresters – empowered with the discourse and tools of scientific 
forestry, and instilled by community forestry to recruit their community members to make 
their forest a better and more forceful environment, or enterprise. The degree of education 
matter only insofar as positions within the formal structures of the CFUG is concerned. 
 The authority over implementation of CF policy is spread over many different levels 
of bureaucracy, and at all levels decisions are influe ced by political and personal interests 
(Fisher 1994). Vanajit and Vasantraj at the Godawari DoF did not consider their branch of the 
DoF under any political pressure, but the DoF often procedural issues regarding distinction of 
jurisdiction between their department and the Department of Resources and Reserves. Such 
contention usually arise when distribution of scarce resources or the appearance of concerns 
of biological diversity in proposed development projects, over which the Department of 
Resources and Reserves have mandate and jurisdiction None among the staff experienced 
pressure from business interests, 'tuulamanji', or organized crime. Vanajit noted that this was 
only a problem at higher levels of state.  There are occasions where the district level were 
engaged in confrontations, particularly with other government institutions. In some issues the 
CFUG shares interest with the DoF against other parts of the bureaucracy – for instance in 
trying to raise resources, at other times, the CFUG opportunistically attempts to harness 
support against the DoF from the other departments, or from experts, in some cases differing 
and competing interests within the community may be vocal through the CFUG, and usually 
the CDC takes a mediating position. In this complex situation, the central authorities have 
mandates that are overriding, suppressive, and may ultimately be nullifies the charters of the 




Case of Ward 6; New Roads of Defiance 
 I journeyed to Ward 6 - Chappakarka – mainly because of a 'New Road' they had spent 
three years in finishing, in defiance of the DoF. It was planned to cross the mountains and 
connect Godawari through Ward 6 with the nearby city of Bhaktapur and bring a new flow of 
tourists to the scenic hillsides, and grant a more central positioning of the ward relative to the 
rest of the village. Ward 6 is a remote part of Bishanku Narayan, lying on the ridge of a hill. I 
arrived there with Sanjit of W1's CFUG, after spending six hours on a three hours' walk, we 
were both ill. I visited their public school which still operates without essential material like 
books, a blackboard, or electricity for that matter, housing 1st to 5th grade. After 5th grade 
children must travel to other places, like Kathmandu if they intend to continue in school, the 
teachers here both travel from Bishanku Narayan every day. The literacy rate is low, while the 
drop-out rate is high, because few have the relations or money, or the priorities for sending 
their children to formal education. On the other hand, the ward had attracted investors to 
establish a hang-gliding base, in association with a home-stay, which incidentally also was the 
home of Deep, the owner of a tea shop and one of the chairmen on the board of the CFUG of 
Ward 6. Community and Private Forests are rented for mushroom plantations, they produce 
alcohol, and recently they have established a mono-crop plantation for the production of 
commercial plant material. There are quite a few prejudices towards the villagers of 
Chappakarka, Ward 6, partly because the majority belong to the minority of Tamang with 
their own language and customs. For instance, and a great source of disfavour among many 
people in Ward 1, is the alcohol distillation that is a prominent subsistence enterprise in Ward 
6, and not to diminish differentials, the Tamang have significantly different marriage customs, 
where both genders marry young and prefer exogamy. In addition, the distance from the 
centre means that Ward 6 has the lowest formal 'performance' in the valley in regards to CF, 
with a minimum five hours walk to trek to and fro ward 1 and 6 means that in the agricultural 
high seasons, no 'breadwinner' can participate in joint 'community' action. The dispersed 
settlement pattern equally means that attendance within the community also is low.  
 Through Sanjit I was introduced to Deep. He had received two diplomas through 
attendance at courses of scientific forestry the last year alone. He explained that the “New 
Road” that had been constructed was financed and built through local action, aided by a 
District Development Engineer helped in planning, and who provided the bulldozer. The road 
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cost the 'community' between two and three lachs (million rupee), which were collected 
through the CFUG and voluntary donations from the locals. The fact that they had been 
breaking the regulations of the Constitution and Management did not seem to have influenced 
them in other ways than furthering avoidance. As explained by the local DoF Secretary 
Vanajit; the road was built without any application r permit from the DoF, but the foresters 
found that they could not stop the development initiative. The locals themselves fully funded 
the road despite being turned down by the District Development Office.  
 The road displayed obvious signs of bad estimates there were several dangerous twists 
and turns, or abandoned stretches of road that ended i  the jungle, as well as a lack of water 
drainage. This ill planned, poorly executed construct is already severely eroded and 
impassable by any vehicle heavier than a bike; considered by secretary Vanajit “a disaster”. 
Several trees were cut down beyond what was by the DoF considered 'necessary', especially 
due to bad planning, the surplus timber distributed among the participants in the construction 
of the road – a common practice. The secretary Vanajit further explained the dilemma:  
“As long as there is the majority of the local society supports such developments, the 
department of Forestry is powerless to impose stateregulations. The whole of CF 
relies on the consensual support of the 'community', and if this support dissolves, the 
whole of community management will collapse.”  
 
The ranger Arpit commented, “this is Jana-sakti.” 'Jana-sakti', in contrast to previous 
ontologies of 'servility', is a conception of a potential aggregate power that emanates from the 
collective Nepali' people, and which can manifest in a range of assorted refusals, most notably 
a refusal to be treated dismissively, or to be submissive, and in the revolt of the mass 
movement.  Jana-sakti arises from the 1992 revolution, when a series of engagements 
between revolutionaries and the army provoked a general outrage at the absence of the King's 
power, and according to Kondos, the lack of enforcement of the ritual legitimacy of the 
monarchy, and this contributed to an emergence of a national consciousness of the potential of 
the inherent power of the people to effect change through mass movement. The power of the 
people, not just to stake claims but to force the massive revolution of society. A recognition of 
a certain kind of national collectivity and a consciousness that transgress 'traditional' 
boundaries,  and the emergence of popular awareness of thi  power of popular mobilization, 
and an orientation of confidence in that potential(Kondos 1994:281-282). This distinguishes 
the new ontology from the servility of the past; and i  fact, the government is finding with 
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jana sakti a reluctance to interfere in local systems. 
 Chappakarka is hardly the only place you will find badly planned and executed road 
construction in Bisankhu Narayan. In fact, according to the DoF officials, roads are the single 
most damaging source of 'degeneration' in the area.Again, it must be reiterated that bad 
planning, and perhaps the formal requirements for legal procedures, are a main problem – the 
latter point admitted to be a problem also by the DoF. Yet, the need for roads to individual 
households in forest areas was disputed by the DoF. But as it is the District Development 
Committee that grants fund for such projects, if contested by the DoF the projects will be 
scrutinized with feasibility studies, and only if there are no other alternatives (as proposed by 
the CDC), the roads will be likely to go ahead. In these situations, external experts often play 
important roles, and will not fall side with the DoF by default. In part because of possible 
monetary, institutional, 'expert', personal or political considerations.  
The CDC secretary informed me while discussing the proposed New Road for Ward 1 
that there are usually never any compensations offered for land loss to roadworks or other 
collective projects. Neither are there any money set a ide for such compensations with the 
District, or Village Development Office, nor precedence for such compensations given by the 
state. It would be up to the local society itself. While it would be of great benefit and as a 
practice it would dampen potential conflict in the arbitration on road proposals, there simply 
were no funds for compensating land loss, and she bluntly said, “what the majority decides 
will be the course of action, and the minority will loose – it is the people's dictatorship”. In 
closing, Kondos says, 'Popular justice' accuses and judges according to what it perceives as 
uncalled for behaviour; not in terms of the strictures of the juridico-legal system. Its 
rationality does not depend on legal principles. (Kondos 1994:276) The community 
governance demands effective action and participation to forge shared commitments. The 
very reliance of the Community Forest Programme on interconnectedness with the wider 
community enforces the resilience of jana-sakti, which entails that a unified 'community' is 
mobilized to support a local initiative, the state cannot stop it without risk of “uprooting” the 
entire Community Forest philosophy. Jana sakti, according to Kondos, only emerges when 
the society as a whole is galvanized into action against social injustice, and this of course 
happens only rarely. It is the new-found potential for the directed realization of popular 
mobilization of jana sakti for socio-political ends that is a constant factor, f  instance in the 
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interaction between governing authorities, and betwe n the and their stakeholders, especially 
regulating the DoF's attitude to the 'community'. 
 The establishment of the CF model, premised on the concept of 'communities', have 
given rise to a new social arena for 'deliberation', a d given the local population access to a 
discourse of modernity and development that is welcomed, broadly speaking, by all 
informants. However, this has happened despite a lack of devolution of legislative or 
managerial powers. Because these 'indigenous' systems had been founded in relational 
'embeddedness' in social networks of the 'multi-vocal society' that included the forest itself, 
they were broad social regulating mechanisms (Fisher 1994). Flexibility of the 'informal 
management systems' is lost in the formal, institutionalized CF-management. It is simply not 
afforded by the standardized demands of the top-down management. Further, as the 
'community' is a state formation, it does not include the wide range of concerns that the 
society it rises from in fact harbours. It is itself a local mediator that balances the interests of 
the population with the interests of the Community Forest programme, while bartering with 
other institutions that are more entrenched in state bureaucracy. It's narrow charter allows 
coordination across wards, but not across sectoral interests, unless for the purpose of 
'development'. What here is important to note, is that most of the stakeholders of a community 
do in fact not participate, as the gender inequality in regards to domestic labour is still at a 
very high level. 
 However, the ambition of the CF programme is to emb d the CFUG's within their 
societies, and this is done gradually through integrating the people into the 'community' of 
educated CFUG managers, and through facilitating the 'participation' of as many as possible 
in self-organised (that is, organised by the CFUG's) activities. The new managers of the forest 
are the farmers of the countryside, well educated by the state institutes in the vicinity. These 
activities are, of course, organised within the framework of the negotiated Management Plan, 
and by the participation, the 'community' is forged from the existing society by inclusion and 
'cultivation' from engagement in planned management and expert discourse. By including 
locals in the management of the forest the state not o ly recognize them as stakeholders with 
responsibilities, but also through the Community Forest User Groups (CFUG) bring families 
into the institutional structure of the state. I go beyond arguing that the inclusion of the local 
'community' in forest management is a dual process of empowerment and a 'regimentation' of 
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the local populace, which I think is a fairly uncontroversial point to make. The move by the 
state, in the face of diminishing forest resources and a failing fencing-policy towards 
management, to change its policies towards inclusion of the local populace was motivated to a 
great extent by an intention to cultivate responsible and self-sustaining village communities 
that would still follow the national agendas; by giving them user-rights they would manage 
the forests and follow the regulations accordingly. This has indeed been acknowledged by 
forestry officials in my field.  
 Hence, as management is decentralized, what is accomplished is a two-fold 
manoeuvre of passing the administration of national bjectives to its constituents, and through 
fostering ownership and participation they cultivate from the constituency a new citizen. In 
raising the 'awareness' of the state objectives through direct dissemination by leaving the 
fleshing out, adjustment, enactment and overseeing of the forest management to local actors 
and the interplay between them, the state apparently devolves power. But in some ways, it 
rather appears to be absorbing local 'communities' nto the administrative structure of the top-
down managerial state. The CF program tries to tap into the wider social interdependence of 
economic decision in common property management where any individual is linked to other 
village residents by ties of kinship (both descent and marriage), shared ritual obligations and 
concerns, personal friendship, and by a complex variety of labour relations (patron-client ties, 
the need to obtain labour, the need to sustain income). Any serious breach of local norms has 
potentially serious social and economic consequences for an individual and its household; and 
by empowering the community the hope is make the social norms of the 'community' conform 
to the state agenda in forestry policy; where free riding both in the national and local level 
becomes subject to the threat of both social exclusion, and more formal sanctions. Conformity 
to shared values is quite a sensible thing to do in such a context of interdependent 
relationships. “There are clearly many places where effective common property resource 
management does not exist, often, I would suggest, precisely because the combination of 
shared norms about forest use and a high level of social interdependence is not present.” 
(Fisher 1994:77) In fact, The Department of Forestry in Godawari prefer that the CFUG's as 
“community representatives” execute “community sanctio ing”; a community's problems are 
best solved from within. There is no obligations or precedence for reporting such events. The 
CFUG's main tools of sanction are fining and exclusion of the CFUG and thereby from its 
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social network, unprecedented so far.  
 
Sustainability and Self-sufficiency 
 Nepali forestry policy since the Rana Prime Minister  has continuously emphasized 
economic productivity. Even while the post-war era, brought popular terms as 'self-
sufficiency' and 'development', these were incorporated into the fiscal policies of the 'green 
revolution' of agriculture. The new Community Forest Policy of Nepal, which incorporates 
ambitions of sustainability, do not make a break with the fiscal aims of previous forestry 
policies. Indeed, instead these fiscal concerns are till central to the national management of 
the 'wealth of the Nation' and to the very notion of 'sustainability'. The emphasis on self-
sufficiency, which previously was connected mainly to agricultural development, became 
more central after the Community Forestry Programme became a government policy. The 
term of self-sufficiency is coupled with the discourse of 'sustainability' under the longitudinal 
reasoning that no project that can't be sustained by a community, either through local 
resources at the CFUG's disposal, through the market, or xternal donors, can be sustained at 
all. This must be seen against the historical context that gave rise to Community Forestry in 
Nepal in the first place; limited state resources to 'fence off' and administer forest resources.  
 The CF program has succeeded in facilitating a 'spirit of enterprise' by entitling 'the 
community' to forest resources, and encouraging them to take advantage of market access. 
Hence, the argument is that in order to be 'sustainable' a project must be founded in 
'community interests', a local resource base, and local participation at some level. There are, 
however, several contradictory policies, such as the subsidy of plantations, that according to 
Gurung (1994) was central in nurturing an initial reliance on government support, contrary to 
the stated goal of 'self sufficiency'. The change of this policy has contributed to the almost 
complete stop in government backed plantation projects in the Districts of Lalitpur, and the 
ending of government support for fencing. As there is an expansion of deliberative space and 
contested meanings, there are also formulated competing narratives and strategies. 
 Villagers that seek recognition as suited candidates for development projects portray 
their management practices in line with the terminology of the 'development narrative'. Vague 
generic templates such as 'community' and 'nature' are open for reinterpretation, appropriation 
and adaption to local conceptions and concerns by locals in arbitration with the various 
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development agents. Assignation of projects will often be determined relative to their 
neighbours and in such cases the question will often arise ''Who are the most deserving'' or 
''who fits our narrative'', and whose practices are the most sustainable or least detrimental? 
These development narratives shape new frameworks f the formulation of existing 
competing interests (Haenn 2005). In addition, both Mikesell and Fisher (1994) points to 
institutional requirements of external donors and expertise in enacting, as well as central level 
institutions to control the 'feasibility' of projects, which inhibits initiative, but on the other 
hand contributes to the conception of 'self-sufficien y' as a model not restricted to subsistence 
as the CFUG's are encouraged to seek and attract external funds and actors. The Forest Act 
also stipulate that the non-governmental organisation should be encouraged to identify, 
implement and evaluate development activities. The NGOs should undertake the local level 
activities in coordination in joint venture with the Community Development Office and the 
CFUG. The Community Development Office can implement local development activities only 
through non-governmental organisations. Mikesell asks why, if the local governments are 
supposedly based on local popular participation, do they need to utilize non-government 
organizations to implement their development activities? Since the Community Development 
Office controls NGO registration, the CDC Secretary ( nd through her the central 
government) controls the official recognition and validation of NGOs. In this way, even 
though reference to NGOs seems to provide a means of implementation separate from the 
government, the government hereby exerts its control over identification, implementation and 
evaluation of development activities. In the context of this hierarchical bureaucratic structure, 
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the central state levels exercise influence over iNGO's and civil society by appropriating 
exclusive rights to define conservation concerns, leaving local concerns a subject to the 
CFUG's various competing concerns.  
Projects should also be approved by authorities after commissioning due feasibility 
studies to assess the impacts on society and environment. And in the face of many of these 
studies there materialize differences between the DoF and local spokespersons; differences in 
in perceived reality and priorities are brought to light (Gurung 1994) despite the CF ideals of 
'shared interests' and enlightened awareness of interrelation. Also, the positional advantage of 
the DoF and the District Development Office enables th se authorities to obstruct or 
“sabotage” any unacceptable plan through interpretations of 'feasibility', (Mikesell 1994:292) 
a potential of the 'multi-tiered bureaucracy 
which leads to a common interest between 
CFUG's and donors to 'fast track' projects at the 
cost of 'feasibility' studies. That such studies 
frequently lead to the execution of community 
action, it is not clear who the beneficiaries are; 
as in the Lions Plantation project and the 
Chappakarka New Road, both cases where 
'feasibility studies' were not performed. 
 
 The Leo & Lions Club Plantation and 
Leadership project in Ward 1 10.09.11 
 It was a sunny September Saturday in 
Ward 1. It was initiated by Lions and Leo Club 
of Kathmandu, together with Sanjit as the local 
initiator from the CFUG. The primary ambition 
of the project was the “training and networking 
for the young and promising leaders of 
tomorrow”, with the secondary and merely 
contextual aim of regeneration. Youth from “all over Nepal” attended, which mainly meant 
the Kathmandu Valley, however there was an almost equal share of women and men, many of 
Lions plantation project 
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them aspiring to become rangers of Community Forestry themselves, others already employed 
in government positions, such as one that worked as a consultant in the department of water 
and sanitation. Sanjit had been contacted by a project manager and together they had made out 
the details of the project according to what Lions could aspire to do, and what the 'community' 
could be in need of. Already, we see signs of the institutional structures that shape the 
relationship. And Sanjit has already at this stage t ilored the depiction of the village, to suit a 
template narrative thought apt for attracting a donor. In this case, however, Lions did not 
require much from the community, and due to problems of communication between the 
CFUG and the NGO, Sanjit had the misconception that w en Lions came, their emphasis 
would be on forestry. The trees had been provided for free by the Department of Forestry, and 
while the CFUG was meant to supply equipment. This wa missed due to the communication 
problems, and led to a slight delay in the daily schedule. As the planting got underway 
however, the main focus came into view Lions and Leo's plantation project was part of their 
'growing future leaders' campaign, and their use of the community forest was primarily as an 
arena for this work. The work and expertise of Lions is primarily founded in leadership 
training, and 'networking', and even though Sanjit had recruited Forester Vasantraj to consult 
in scientific forestry, these advises were not included into practice, although a full lecture was 
held on scientific forestry and plantations, where th  locals could speak freely, the three 
people that came, that is. What made matters worse than the non-scientific praxis of the 
planting was the non-exclusive manner in which the main focus of the work was excersised. 
Because of leadership organisations such as Lions, but also Rotary, are to hold locally situated 
leadership courses, they should also include the locals in these projects, rather than using 
them as sites for development' 
 Forester Vasantraj was severely displeased with the work done, for instance the lack of 
regimentation in regards to geometry and equality made mapping of the field hard after the 
fact, and he explained that it would impinge on the optimal growth of the trees. Also, as the 
planting was of a composite plantation, it would have been advisable to plant the trees 
according to some plan in regards to species distribution, which was not done. He felt the 
project was wasting his day off and 'spoiling' the rational order of the forest that both CFUG 
and DoF held in common, despite his best instructions. Sanjit persuaded the head of Lions' 
fieldwork to pay Vasantraj 500 RP for his time and trouble, and then they left both very 
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annoyed.  
 Many trees were left over, partly because of delays in the beginning of the day that 
ensured that the project ran out of time. Many of these trees were given to local shops, where 
they were sold for-profit by the shopkeepers. However, upon returning to the plantation 10 
days later to investigate the problem of fencing, we found several garbage bags of discarded 
trees in ditches near the plantation. There are no routine system for feedback on development 
projects, no measure of quality of the actions undertak n or attempt to draw experience from 
projects, good nor bad. Sanjit, however, as organizing party of the CFUG, attempted to send e-
mails and complain to the DoF about the discarded trees. The survival rate of the planted trees 
at the plantation proved to be about 40%, a figure confirmed by the DoF and Sanjit to be 
about average, considering the issues of grazing.  
 
Conclusion 
 The mutual engagement of 'community' and foresters in social deliberative space make 
room for the production of new 
significance and landscapes, as 
well as the production of new 
science,  as the farmers 
themselves are 'empowered' 
through training and education 
in government sponsored 
forestry courses. CFUG 
engagement produce  
commodified time through the 
practices that are taught and 
spread through, but not exclusively within the sector of forestry, and the relationship between 
these 'cultivated citizens' bring new perspectives and time management through their 
conversation with the wider society, and they show the practical use of these concepts and 
practices by pointing to the accomplishments of community forestry. Thus we see that 
entitlements and the education provided through training changes the possibilities and 
obstructions that reside in the situational context. The same is true for the repertoire of 
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resistance, whether one is engaged within the discour e of CF, or distanced from it. Through 
the friction between state officials and villagers, the terms and limits of state authority are 
constantly subverted, and the boundaries between local autonomy and state power are 
reconstructed in an ongoing arbitration. These commn engagements, whether in committee 
meetings or in the Lions plantation project, contribute to the reconstruction of society and the 
production of a new kind of citizen that are self-administrative, capable risk-managers in 
accordance with “the latest” of rational discourse (B ck 2004, Baldwin 2003, Haenn 2005, 
Sivaramakrishnan 2000). In fact, the institution of CF insists on its material of substance 
through its encompassing and inclusive activities within a social landscape of 
interdependence; that is – the social bonds of mutual obligations mentioned by Fisher in 
regards to the social fabric that underlines 'communities'(1994). Establishing the community 
is not only accomplished through the charters of the Constitution, but by affirming the 
interdependence of forests and farmers through participa ory engagement. Not to mention the 
threats of actual civil sanctions or of mobilized jana-sakti (people power) (Kondos 1994) that 
the CFUG's have at their potential disposal through protocol and networks. In order to oppose 
these new and formal institutions of the Community Forestry requires to position oneself in 
the discourse of scientific forestry, and to partake in the confirmation of its reality, and in a 
'colonization of consciousness' (Comaroff & Comaroff 1992).  
 I briefly discussed the history of Nepali forestry regimes and the central state's attempt 
to extend and retain control over the 'wealth of the Nation'. We see throughout this discussion 
that fiscal concerns have remained crucial to Community Forestry, and laid the foundation of 
the 'forest first' policy that is in place today.  As a consequence of the decentralization policy 
that was begun nearly 40 years ago, the forests of Nepal are increasingly “handed over” to the 
people of the 'community'; those that have become truly 'empowered' through participation in 
the CF discourse. As we have seen, the central government is decentralizing the responsibility 
of management from the centralized departments to the locally founded CFUG's, and in the 
process disseminating the practices of 'good governance' and 'scientific management' through 
the Community Forestry program. Community Forestry is not only envisioned as a path to the 
self-sufficient local society, sought since the Green Revolution by the state apparatus, but it 
also is an efficient way of 'cultivating' enlightened citizens. It is a two-sided process of both 
empowering and educating the local society in the discourse and practice of modern scientific 
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management. 
 So what does the CFUG's and their sister committees govern apart from their practical 
jurisdictions as defined from central authorities? The key lies in the engagement with 
scientific discourse that lend a credibility of 'objective fact' that allows the participants of 
CFUG's to become experts and 'entrepeneurs of modernity'. Through the practical work, and 
the adoption of the discourse of development, these agents not only spread the practice of 
modernity into the society, but they also promote an ideology of rational self management in 
the 'community'. Through recruitment into active participation in forestry activity together 
with the DoF experts, common referents are forged and in situo of the interrelationship with 
the local landscape the 'community' is made a part of society.  
 What makes the Nepali Community Forest Programme truly utopian is the attempt to 
overcome both middle levels of bureaucracy and the critique of template plans as top-down 
abstract approaches.  Through the employment of 'participation' as a basis for the self-
replication the CFUG's are sought by planners to become vessels of 'good governance'; in 
compliance with state directives, their self-administration and management of the local 
society will produce the 'communities' envisaged in the template narrative, from the bottom – 
up, across the country. This is the utopian plan, that factors in hybridization processes of 
diversity as a part of the force of its integration nto society. Part of the accomplishment that 
ensures the continued central control stems from the formal restrictions of the Constitution 














CHAPTER 4  
Commercialization of Communities 
 
Nepali Time 
 There is in Nepal a widespread term roughly describing a condition; called 'Nepali 
Time'. This does not mean that this condition of 'Nepali Time' is uniquely “Nepali”, but I was 
informed that the term is has a long oral tradition by sources both from Pokhara and 
Kathmandu to Bisankhu Narayan. Time is experienced differentially according to 
circumstance to most Nepali. Most don't use personal planners, don't make schedules for 
weeks or months and assign little value to 'Time'. The western expression “time is money” has 
little hold in Nepal. Nepali time “takes place”, and you may experience its events or you may 
not – accidents frequently occur, or something comes up. Time does not pass, but is a realm of 
'eternal return', “tomorrow never comes” to quote a Pokhara informant, it is cyclical, in that 
most people let the cycles of night and daylight govern their active time. Even as there are 
people working in NGO's who are subjected to 'commodified' time (Debord 1967) 15, they 
still have to adapt to the rhythm of the household, which is governed by cyclical time and 
ritual.  
 The rituals of cyclical time are so predictable that even if most don't know what they 
will do the coming week, all know what they will do next Dhasain or Tiz festival, or father's 
day. These are great occasions for family gatherings, and people travel across Neap to visit 
their families. The two defining meals of the day; daahl bhad  frame the productive day, and 
form part of the governmentality of cyclical time. In the city of Bhaktapur, and the village of 
Bistachhap alike, almost every shop opens at the same time in the morning, only after ample 
time for pujas and daal bhat, a regimentation imposed by the cycles of day and ritual that are 
not conduitive to the flexibile regime fordist, 'commodified time'. 
 The concept of 'Nepali time', aids in bridging thegap between cyclical and 
'commodified' time, as 'Nepali time' is apt to cope with strikes, accidents, road blocks, and 
                                                 
15 “The time of production – commodified time – is an infinite accumulation of equivalent intervals. It is 
irreversible time made abstract, in which each segment need only demonstrate by the clock its purely 
quantitative equality with all the others. It has no reality apart form its exchangeability”. (Debord 1967:147) 
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other forms of unpredicted delays. In a way, since the lack of infrastructure, hazards of 
environment and geography, and social inequality are considerable, there is ultimately not 
much point in time management and detailed planning. Too many of the sources of 'risk' still 
lies beyond the reach of personal control, and hence, the rational, cultivated citizen struggles 
more in coping with the ideals of self-management and fiscal budgeting of one's own 
resources, than the average nepali, that is not as deeply embedded in the pseudo-cyclical 
rhythm of work and “free time”. Scheduling and 'fixed' ('commodified') time becomes a 
source of stress and extra planning, as extra care must be taken to investigate that the plans 
are in fact kept by other parties, that accidents or strikes have not necessitated modifications, 
etc. This must not be mistaken for resignation; most Nepali are enterprising and actively seek 
new approaches to problem solving. Indeed, what we see here in Nepali time is the 
manifestation of the tension of two different temporal regimes.   
 
Commodification of Time 
 Community Forest User Groups have been chartered as the formally recognized 
representatives of the local society, yet they still depend on the continuing support and 
participation of their stakeholders. The program is promoted in keeping with dominant 
orthodoxies in international development discourse; where local communities are abstracted 
as distinct entities with the best available knowledg  for the appropriate management of local 
resources, with a shared identity that enable it to mobilize towards common, collective 
interests (Leach, Mearns & Scoones 1997). The emphasis on fiscal interests and market 
access, however, ensure that the CFUG's become a mechanism that continue the 
commodification of the forest, in line with previous policies.  
 The Community Forestry Programme shows promising signs of raising living 
standards of its stakeholders, not merely through the distribution of proceeds of sales 
according to an equality principle, but also through the emphasis on community forestry as an 
efficient regime for the forest as a “site of development” that can attract investors from civil 
society, and on incorporating regimes of 'local knowledge' into fiscal plans (O.Gurung 1994, 
Leach, Mearns & Scoones 1997). What you first see wh n you approach Bistachhap is the 
plantation forest with its curious patterned trunks on the left hand side, markings from years 
of tapping resin for making turpentine. Other wards were growing sabai grass. Both pine resin 
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and sabai grass are Non-timber forest products (NTFP's) that were promoted and marketed in 
forestry programmes through the Master Plan for the For stry Sector as of 1988. In addition 
to the CFUG's there are private enterprises such as bamboo and mushroom plantations, and 
common goods such as forest litter and grass are commodified either directly through 
harvesting or via processing (as in the production of biofuel). NTFP's fall within the 
government aims of 'sensitivity to local needs', and 'regards for diversity' – and ultimately 
works towards 'self sufficiency; “that forests should empower the user group through 
sustainable development” (Chhetri 1994:30), but well ithin the context of a policy of 
economic growth. Through the fiscal management of the CFUG, Non-timber Forest products 
become an important source of income generation for the 'community'. With the emphasis on 
market orientation remaining, the NTFP's are an important contribution to 'community 'self-
sufficiency' and enterprise. The new services and pro ucts revealed through the discourse of 
commodification open new possibilities and for work and organisation within the framework 
of the CFUG, like the community forest mushroom farm or commercial picnic sites for 
domestic tourism.  
 Picnicking is a valued collective activity, engaged in by many and at most parts of the 
year. In envisioning picnicking as a possible tourst attraction, most draw upon their own 
associations and experiences, whether these come fr the annual communal picnics 
organized by the Communal Welfare Committee on the basis of caste identity, or gender and 
family-related picnics that are traditionally associated with festivals; like tihar festival, after 
traditionally foodstuffs were collected that women would use for picnics in the forest. These 
'traditional' forms of picnics are changing form, as the Community Welfare Committee is 
loosing its popularity, and competing welface committees are rising that organize not on the 
basis of caste and ward, but across wards, on the basis of 'common interest'. In regards to the 
gender-discriminatory ritalized men's and women's clubs, they have largely abandoned the 
structure of excluding the opposite sex from their circles. In addition, money has a more 
central place during the festivals than food, which means that due to the exchangeability of 
money, many exchange these for consumption rather than social gathering.  
 The younger members of the CFUG in ward 1 have suggested the possibility of 
building on this  existing local practice of collective and private social gatherings in the forest, 
into a community forest enterprise, where a scenic commercial picnic spot is established 
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permanently in the community forest, under CFUG administration. This might require the 
exclusion of locals in order to make it more exclusive to domestic tourists, and in pointing to 
existing scenic spots with religious purposes, they felt this could easily be done. In other 
words, in translating the existing concept of a religious scenic environment, with the local 
practice of collective picnics into the context of the market-oriented CFUG engaging tourism.  
 
Self-governing Citizens 
 CFUG stakeholders are cultivated through the participation in Community Forestry to 
incorporate routines self-management, including scheduling, budgeting, family planning, 
(CFUG Sanjit), and, crucially, incorporate these modern concepts of 'progress' into their more 
or less cyclical lived reality. Now that the CFUG is encouraging people to start organizing, 
not only their time, but also their personal households, there is encouragement to parcel out 
one's time in productive activity. With the fiscal budgeting of time as a resource appears the 
expression of 'wasted time', with is premised on the notion that there is something better to 
occupy oneself with. This is of course not a new concept, as noted, laziness is a widely used 
expression, and people who find no work may quickly find themselves “lazy”, as inactivity 
has never been appreciated. As 'grandpa Bista' espoused; “ One should always have something 
useful to do, and if one has no work, there is always something to clean. If you have cleaned 
everything already, go out and clean the courtyard, if necessary, do that again!” - a lesson 
taught him while serving for the British in India. But there is short supply of work to engage 
in (with the exception of household tasks, of course), and there is no leisure industry. Among 
those who have less access to meaningful work we see the rise of boredom and inactivity 
together with the first glimpse of consumable, 'trivialized'  'free' or “spare time”(Hakim Bey 
1991) 16. Under the social reign of commodified time, “time is everything, man is nothing; he 
is at most the carcass of time” (Debord 1967:147).  
 About 40% of the in Bishanku Narayan migrate to work in urban areas in the early 
morning and return late in the afternoon, living with one foot in cyclical and the other in 
commodified time. The same is in part true for the youth who attend school in Kathmandu 
and Lalitpur. Meals, however, are prepared not according to the schedules of offices, shops or 
                                                 
16 According to Hakim Bey (1991) TAZ The Tong 'Free Time' is connected to work and leisure. 'Free time' is a 
consumable form of leisure that is mediated through the entertainment industry, and a trivialized form of the 
equivalent of 'empty time' that remains entrenched in a cyclical regime of time. The temporal eternal return. 
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schools, but according to ritual cycles and cyclical time. Hence, in most households, the 
subjects of commodified time must leave on empty stomachs, and equally return home to a 
cold meal. These cycles of rite are communal in the sense that all Hindu  households perform 
them at roughly the same time, and this also means that, for instance there is no competition 
between shopkeepers in regards to opening hours, as they all have puja, eat, and open at 
roughly the same time. This is, however, part of the self-administration that these cultivated 
citizen must, and are educated to manage through courses, as part of the risk management that 
is being privatized onto communities by the central government.  
 Problems of infrastructure which inhibit integration of 'commodified time' pose 
problems for large parts of society that relies on predictability in planning, leading to stress in 
order to keep up with and balance domestic, ritual and professional responsibilities, creating 
time as a resource – commodifying time. The slight ncrease in access to 'time-saving 
technologies' makes for the possibilities for those who have more financial wealth to “buy 
time to save time” (processed foodstuffs, hired labour, etc.). Within the regime of cyclical 
time, there was some truth to the claim that time was a resource all possessed in equal 
amount, but in a capitalist society where time becomes commodified, time forms part of the 
generalized economic imbalances of society.  
 The answer from the state seems to be to raise awareness and to privatize risk, through 
the aid of donor organisations in civil society that works with Disaster Risk Reduction and 
similar projects; in order to improve self-management on the local level. Planning and risk 
suddenly become a personal matter, rather than something reserved for experts. Local 
involvement in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is recommended by NGO's such as Oxfam as 
successful initiatives to increase 'resilience' and ' wareness' of 'communities', and they 
recommend institutionalization and 'mainstreaming' of DRR in government policy as a whole 
in order to shift the emphasis from response to risk management (Oxfam 2009). Disaster 
prevention work can affect cosmology in relation to the conception of what is beyond human 
control, and what is subject to human manipulation, by whom. Shifting this relation will 
affect the politics and power relations of any society. A difference between the 'risk society' 
(Beck 2004), and earlier societies is that 'threats' and 'dangers' are only attributed to external 
factors, and that society is confronted by itself when it is to handle 'risk'. Almost every human 
action in the world becomes a possible source of risk and danger. Expert knowledge and 
63 
science becomes overtly contested, self-referential, and self-reflexive. The expansion of the 
domain of risk involves not only a change in conceptions of risk and danger, but also a 
potential shifting of what is political and what is a domain for science and expert knowledge – 
altering the social landscape in both material and epistemological ways (Beck 2004). This 
further modifies the new citizen with a strong focus on self-sufficiency, but also with a new 
focus on private risk-management. 
 
Commodification and Marginilization 
 We see in these developments the marginalizing of forest landscape, in the aim of 'self 
sufficiency'. Already there is a marked reduction of picnicking in the forest in Ward 1, most 
felt in related to the official communal picnics, but also in the sense that in greater degree, 
people picnic in the peripheral j ngal areas, or their gardens, rather than in the forest itself. 
This, and a strict upholding of the forest regulations in regards to forest hygiene and aesthetics 
(IO CFUG Sanjit), suggests that the CFUG of Ward 1 discourages unofficial social activity in 
its forest as a probable source of littering and polluti n, disorder in its ordered landscape of 
scientific management. However, these dreams of domestic tourist attractions, even if close to 
Kathmandu, must still come to terms to the problem as posed; without commodified time, 
there can be little entertainment industry. In fact no urban centres have yet established the 24-
hour society, and the curfew is still enforced at 12 o'clock in the evening. 
 Community Forestry, based on the management of the silvicultural methods of science 
lies well within the temporal regime of 'production' (Debord 1967), which Hakim Bey (1991) 
describes as a Fordist time. This is the empty timeof science and history; the irreversible, 
linear time that is also sometimes termed 'objectiv' me. This time of production also has a 
complimentary consumable form; what Debord (1967) terms pseudo-cyclical time17. The 
commercial enterprise of forestry, and the cultivation of new, self-managing – especially risk 
managing citizens, is party to spreading the pseudo-cyclical time beyond its sector of origin, 
with a greater efficiency than before. In the case of collective forestry activities, such as resin 
tapping, the Time of Production is enforced by the CFUG with both positive and negative 
sanctions: absentees are fined and those that contribute frequently receive surplus proceeds 
                                                 
17 The pseudo-cyclical time is in fact merely a consumable disguise of the production system's 
commodified time. It exhibits the […] essential traits of [commodified, or Fordist] time: homogeneous 
exchangeable units and suppression of any qualitative dimension.” (Debord 1967:147) 
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(IO CFUG W1 Sanjit, IO CFUG W7 Singh). 
 The marginalization of time and space are processes concurrent and related with 
commercialization; as time is being recast as a 'resource', the previously open and free spaces 
are marginalized and regulated; As formerly “empty time” and “free space” went hand in 
hand, there is a rise of regulated – not restricted – space, and consumer activities, which 
require status or money, giving rise to a question of 'timing'; many lack the money to purchase 
'entertainment', which comes in short supply, but most still have 'empty time', but this is no 
longer an expression of freedom, but rather of neglect of duty, or perhaps of poverty. 
However, even those with money to purchase entertainment have little entertainment industry 
to supply them, and hence, they are left in the same category; a lot of 'free time'. There is, as 
of yet, an absence of an entertainment industry geared toward the domestic population. There 
has until recently been no 'free time', only 'empty time'(Hakim Bey 1991), and now that more 
and more people, especially young people, find themselves with 'free time', they also find 
themselves bored or decreed as lazy. 
 When it comes to potential for development in the village, tourism ranks high, and 
among the possibilities that are raised are the resrvation of community forest for tourism 
purposes; picnicking and the construction of other pl asant small commercial resorts on a 
collective basis. In order to make these sites truly commercial (that is; well kept, attractive, 
self-sustaining and income-generating), these would be ticketing and possibly exclude locals. 
However, my claim is that in order for there to be generated a basis for domestic tourism, 
there must first be made room for 'consumable', 'pseudo-cyclical' time which is a premise for 
the “free time”, or vacation of domestic tourism. It is not to be confused eternally returning 
cyclical, festive occasions, which is hardly “empty time”, and is neither planned, nor 
spontaneous. In the dominant cyclical time, there is just the empty time, time that you occupy. 
As the market relies on commodified time; the leisure industry needs the infrastructure to 
facilitate domestic tourism, and people need to have the available, (that is “free(d)”) time and 
resources to consume (Debord 1967). With cyclical tme there are no plans to be made, and all 
journeys you make are predictable in their planlessn  thanks to 'Nepali time' as a coping 
mechanism. 
 The strange effect of seeming to have 'too much time' come from the combination of a 
lack of an entertainment industry, and structural underemployment.  People who still have no 
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relationship with the pseudo-cyclical and capitalis time regimes still only relate time as it 
brings events, which come as chartered in the given Nepali calendar. They do not normally 
schedule their time in any other way, and thus do not experience waste or stress in regards to 
time, as the cycle of the day is imbued by a cadre of itual signs and social norms one can 
bend. “Staying out late”, for instance, has completely different significance in cyclical vs. 
commodified temporal regimes. 
 
Conclusion 
 Community Forestry's scientific regime of planning and market-oriented strategies are 
cultivated in its constituency to breed new citizens, as they discipline their lives along the 
lines of linear time that plans can be made according to schedule. Even more importantly, as 
the modern obey the laws of scientific management, and not ritual or seasonal traditions; and 
represent a break with the old institutions of cyclical time, while still carrying a “natural”, 
pseudo-cyclical rhythm, in that there are actually seasons in most management of nature.  
 As in other modern, capitalist ventures 'commodifie ' time is essential to the 
predictable and flexible operation of the market. It is not a question of option or agenda in this 
regard, the shift from 'cyclical' time to 'commodified' time - is a result of exposure to 
globalization, in particular – capitalism. There is a connection between the commercialization 
of the 'community' through the activities of the CFUG, as it is deeper engaged in the society 
than individual employment in the private or public sector, and its discourse and tools spread 
through social deliberative space. The responsibility for managing a 'self sufficient' forest 
breeds nurtures a 'spirit of enterprise' which makes th  Community Forestry programme one 
of the foremost contributors to the commercialization of the social landscape in Bistachhap. 
The Community Forest, as a miniature of the ideal, ordered state, functions as a 'theatre of 
industry', encapsulates the wonders of rational management and the progress of capitalism, 
cultivating the 'awareness' (to quote the dominant local term) of the values of Community 
Forestry through participation. 
 This way, the community itself becomes subject to commercializaton processes 
through the emerging markets of 'non-timber forest ources and the consequent 
marginalization of social space and cyclical time. This follows from the combination of 
market orientation in forestry, and the inclusion of villagers in the scheduled regimes of 
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commodified time (Debord 1967) whom are subjected to the governmentality of the 
management and budgeting of the Community Forestry regime.  
 On a closing note, the generation of “trivialized” 'free time' creates an opening; room 
for redistribution of domestic work; as inactivity s never appreciated, a new regime of time 
that dictates that casual activity is not productive or socially conductive, would give room for 
putting unemployed men to work in the house, with a more equal share – especially the young 
males who presently easily skips their domestic chores duties for junior sisters to take. If time 
becomes a resource that is limited, for families to distribute as well as for individuals, a 
process that is underway, this “qualitative inactivity – empty time” may become more difficult 























Chapter 5  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The Community Forest User Group and its forest was seemingly well functioning in 
Bisankhu Narayan, Ward 1, especially in the formalistic terms of 'performance'. Whereas 
problems exist in the realm of scientific forestry and fiscal policy, the practical implications of 
this go beyond this text. The village's relatively homogonous composition in terms of caste 
may have played part in diminishing division and conflict. This relatively low level of conflict 
and high level of conformity to shared referents may be a contributing factor to the CFUG's 
reluctance to deal actively with issues of grazing, as such action would be a source of conflict 
in the constituency.  
 The 'community'; the stakeholders of the CFUGs, have been 'cultivated' as risk-
managing and self-administrating citizens through participation in the development discourse 
and practice of community forestry, and their representatives in the CFUG are expert at 
specialists at utilizing the language and terminology f development to express their “needs 
and wants” in line with certain international narratives of local governance. This is of course 
relevant, and recognizable everywhere, also in the village of Bistachhap; where foreigners are 
cast as potential foreign direct investors and/or donors, or at least curious tourists, and the 
civil society cast the various villagers as a 'community' of enterprising forest-people, or, 
perhaps, as libertarians for market access, with many more caricatures at hand. And this is a 
two-way process that is occurring in the multitude of arenas, including national political 
parties, international agencies, and intricate networking including the internet. The civil 
society and international donors have over time givn rise to a national bureaucracy dedicated 
to managing invested funds, and although this bureaucracy is primarily concerned with its 
own interests rather than responding to the interests of the population or international 
agencies and donors (Mikesell 1994:293), the state eems to prefer the local population to 
seek external donors from private initiatives or civil society, rather than dividing scarce 
resources between competing interests – or making detailed policies – which also could be a 
drawn out, contested political process. As such, we see in the local communities the CFUG's 
and the individual actors projecting the 'community' and its project(s) in line with a more or 
less tailored image in order to suit the needs of the donor organizations (IO NGO Bahrav).  
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 This 'tailored image' is also to a certain extent used to compare the 'community ' to 
neighbouring Wards, and I take this to signify that the community forest and its representation 
significant to the self-representations among the villagers, of the 'community' as a whole, and 
of themselves as individuals. It is not a far cry to say that a well run community forest is a 
source of a certain pride, and the forest condition s seen by most as a representative reflection 
of the society; as the CFUG that is responsible for the forest and its regeneration is a 
representative core of the 'community' – it naturally follows that a healthy and well managed 
forest goes with a harmonious and ordered community – vice versa. Not least because an ill 
managed forest will certainly be well known. The mobilization to participate in the 
management, not only in committees, but also in practic l work, is hence very important, 
because it drives the sense of community and the validity of the claim to pride in a well run 
forest – or the impression of one. Because in this,ere could be great differences between 
'the wealth of the community' and the actual forest condition. The force of mobilization, and 
the outward splendour mobilized through scientific management and 'good governance' and 
good 'performance' rating contrary to other parties when the great annual or decennial 
negotiations are held is a source of pride. The greate  the mobilization, not only the greater 
the spread of the practices and philosophy of Community Forestry, but also the stronger the 
claim to representative legitimacy on part of the CFUG, and hence also the greater the 
growing sense of hamro ban, if such an expression is appropriate to denote the forest as a 
source of pride, identity and interdependence. 
 A problem resulting from the strict top-tier bureaucracy with limited local powers, and 
the demands on projects for external supervision and support is a severe amount of under-
reporting. Often local initiators gather public support with the aid of 'thulamanji', sometimes  
completely skipping procedures of protocol and official approval or funding for their projects, 
preferring instead to enact them clandestinely. If a sufficient majority of the population is 
rallied, they will not be stopped for fear of undermining the consensus that is the foundation 
of the philosophy of the Community Forestry (Kondos 1994, DoF Ranger Arpit, CDC 
Secretary). This is a significant change after the Revolutionary years of the 1990s. 
 Community Forests are constructed as utopian models of rational, scientific 
management in the sense that they while are planned o  the basis of a national template, they 
are also produced in the local context as 'theatres of industry' through participation in 
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community forestry, under the patronage of the state. Through this utopian arena of 
engagement, scheduled time and other essential features of industrial capitalism is are 
embedded in practice, and help forge the rational, risk managing citizen. The 'empowerment' 
frequently spoken of in the Nepali CF programme is the access to the discourse and tools of 
science that is the other side of this 'colonization of consciousness' (Comaroff 1992). The 
Community Forest and its CFUG is a miniature society that inspire faith in modernity and 
development in the hands of 'local communities', and they are constantly re-created and 
deeper embedded in the social matrix of the already xisting society through recruitment to 
community forestry.   
 The utopian aspect of the national Community Forest Programme fully blooms on the 
aggregate level as the effects of the processes in CF spread beyond the field of forestry deeper 
into local societies. As increasing spheres of social space and time are subjected to 
commodification, the greater is the awareness of time as a factor; as a 'resource' as some 
would say. With fewer activities to engage in, the more 'empty time' is at hand, encountering 
then variables such as exclusion and loneliness (perha s due to for instance income difference 
and differences in access to 'entertainment industries'), there is a rise in levels of 'boredom' 
and “aimlessness”/“inactivity”; created not necessarily in changes in the access to work, but 
rather the lack of access to 'entertainment', and an increasing awareness of time, coupled with 
multiple encouragements to 'economize' time and to plan the future and present; rather 
pointless activities in the eras of cyclical time where most activity either is given or more or 
less spontaneous response to circumstances, needs and wants. In Nepal; time is not a resource, 
there is no expectation from the society for people r individuals to begin 'rationing their 
time', it is still in a regime of 'eternal return'. Although there are significant exceptions, for 
instance people in government or NGO jobs who struggle with the lack of commodified time 
that would improve legibility and predictability intheir 'daily schedule' (another unfamiliar 
word in Bistachhap). However, cyclical time doesn't give provisions for overtime, and both 
employees in NGO's and students suffer stress and practical problems in the border between 
the 'ritualized' or 'cyclical' regime of time, and the economic regime of commodified time. In 
face of these developments, it is clear that the comm dification processes that come through 
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